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DISCRIMINATING GENDER: LEGAL,
MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL PRESUMPTIONS
ABOUT TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX
PEOPLE
Janet Dolgin*
INTRODUCTION

Medicine and law have long assumed and re-enforced a binary view of
gender in proposing care for and defining the rights of transgender and
intersex people. This Article considers that history and its consequences for
the people most directly affected by it. Further, it considers recent
challenges to the binary gender presumption and to the medical and legal
responses that that presumption has engendered.'
In crafting responses to the needs of transgender and intersex people,
both law and medicine have echoed society's assumptions about sex2 and

* Jack and Freda Dicker Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University; Professor of Science Education, Hofstra Northwell School
of Medicine; Director, Gitenstein Institute for Health Law and Policy (Hofstra Law). B.A. Barnard
(philosophy); Ph.D. Princeton (anthropology); J.D. Yale. I am grateful to Isaac Samuels,
Reference Librarian (Hofstra Law), for his generous help identifying bibliographic sources and to
Jean Krebs, joint-degree student in law and public health at Hofstra University, for her intelligent
assistance with research for this Article. Finally, I am grateful to Melissa Kessler, Associate
Director, Gitenstein Institute, Hofstra law school and to Christopher Czerwonka, Senior Fellow,
Gitenstein Institute, Hofstra law school, and Research Fellow, Center for Policy Research,
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, SUNY Albany, for their insightful comments on
an early draft of this paper.
1. This recent trend may, itself, prove to be short-lived, at least for now. Since the start of
the Trump administration, in early 2017, federal policy has moved away from support for
transgender people. For instance, in July 2017, Donald Trump announced through the Twitter
medium that the U.S. military would prohibit service by transgender people. Julie Hirschfield
Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Says TransgenderPeople Will Not Be Allowed in the Military,

N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/trump-transgendermilitary.html?_r-0. Further, the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice have withdrawn
interpretations of federal law that protected transgender and intersex people. See infra Part IV.
2. See Ann-Maree Nobelius, What Is the Difference Between Sex and Gender?, MONASH
UNIv. MED., NURSING, AND HEALTH SCI. (June 23, 2004), http://www.med.monash.edu.au/
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gender3 and have, in turn, developed explanations and rules for intersex and
transgender communities.4 Although open to challenge in recent years, the
notion that a binary approach to gender and its correlates are inexorably
grounded in biological truths is deeply embedded in Western culture. Yet,
more than one percent of people are born intersex,5 and transgender people
are estimated to account for between 0.1 and 0.5 percent of the population.6
The presumption that gender refers to two mutually exclusive
categories of people - one female, one male - has been challenged less
often than other presumptions that support traditional views of family,
reproduction, sex, and personhood in the United States. Yet, the assumption
that all people are either male or female conflicts with reality' - a conflict
that holds major consequences for intersex and transgender people. This
Article suggests that the strength of the binary-gender presumption
underlies many of the differences in society, medicine, and the law's modes
of discriminating against transgender people and their modes of
These differences have had
discriminating against intersex people.'
consequences for the ability of people in these populations to receive
gendermed/sexandgender.html (defining "sex" in reference to "biological differences,
chromosomes, hormonal profiles, internal and external sex organs").
3. The National Center for Transgender Equality defines "gender identity" as "your internal
knowledge of your own gender-for example, your knowledge that you're a man, a woman, or
another gender." Frequently Asked Questions About Transgender People, NAT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 19, 2016), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/
files/docs/resources/Understanding-Trans-Full-July-2016_0.pdf
See DAVID VALENTINE, IMAGINING
4. The term "community" is used loosely.
TRANSGENDER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A CATEGORY 72 (2007) (citing TOM BOELLSTORFF, THE
GAY ARCHIPELAGO: SEXUALITY AND NATION IN INDONESIA (2005)) (noting that when he began

an ethnography of transgender people, he came to realize that there is no "pre-existing
community," but rather "a variety of dispersed places which are brought together by 'transgender'
into an idea of community.").
5. Xavier Symons, Human Rights Group Callsfor Ban on Intersex Surgery, BIOEDGE.ORG
(July 29, 2017), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/human-rights-group-calls-for-ban-on-intersexsurgery/12363?utm source=BioEdge&utm campaign-ab0a5e08ecEMAIL CAMPAIGN 2017 07 29&utm medium=email&utm term=076ab23e62cab0a5e08ec-124706243 (noting that "as many as 1.7 percent of babies are different from what is
typically called a boy or a girl").
6. Gary J. Gates, LGBTIdentity: A Demographer'sPerspective, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693,
698 (2012) (citing GARY J. GATES, How MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND

TRANSGENDER? 5 (2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-HowMany-People-LGBT-Apr-2011 .pdf).
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion infra Parts II-III. Some people identify as both transgender and intersex;
the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
acknowledges that a person can be both intersex and transgender. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-5 451, 456 (5th ed.
2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-5].
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wanted medical care, to avoid unwanted care, to marry, to gain access to
bathrooms and locker rooms that conform with gender identity, and to join
sports teams.9 Such differences in treatment shape and are shaped by the
lens through which law, medicine, and society understand and respond to
intersex and transgender individuals.
The medicalizationo of transgender and intersex people, especially
since the second half of the twentieth century, has buttressed the binarygender perspective and has played a significant role in framing judicial
responses in cases involving these populations. Medicalization offers a
powerful frame for understanding and controlling variations in gender and
sex; its effects have sometimes, but not always, been salutary.
Medicalization has had different consequences for intersex and transgender
people, depending on the particular issues at stake. Intersex activists decry
the medicalization and consequent treatment of intersex infants, treatment
often aimed at categorizing them as female or male (though more often
female, than male) and thus masking their intersex status and sometimes
depriving them of a reproductive future and even of sexual enjoyment." In
contrast, many transgender people have struggled to obtain medical care
that shapes their sex and their bodies to conform with their gender
identities. Transgender status was also medicalized by the American
Psychiatric Association, and then more recently, de-medicalized by the
same group.12
For the most part, medicalization has assumed that all people should be
categorizable as male or female, with little room for visible ambiguities.
That approach has reinforced the presumption that everyone should and can
identify as male or female. 3 Yet, that understanding of gender has begun to
splinter as society has begun to view gender as a reflection of cultural
choices as well as biology.

9. The list offered here includes areas of discrimination addressed in this Article. There are
other important areas of discrimination impacting intersex and transgender people, for instance in
employment, that are not addressed here.
10. See infra Subsection I.A.2.
11. See Whitney Barnes, The Medicalization of Transgenderism, TRANSHEALTH (July 18,
2001), http://www.trans-health.com/2001/medicalization-of-transgenderism/.
12.

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-IV] (replaced in
5th addition by term "gender dysphoria"); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-5, supra note 8.
13. See Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law, 11
ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 200 (2002).
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Part I of this Article reviews efforts to define and explain intersex and
transgender status. 14 First, the Part summarizes social, medical, and
biological definitions and responses. Then, Section B contextualizes these
definitions and responses within the larger history and culture of the West.
Finally, it describes alternative approaches to gender and sex in several
other societies.
Part II then examines the implications of the binary-gender approach
for intersex people asking to be identified with no gender or with more than
one gender. Section A summarizes efforts by intersex litigants in the
United States to be recognized as such on passports and other identity
documents. Then, Section B reviews efforts by transgender people to
change identity documents so that they reflect gender identity.
Part III addresses the strength of the binary-gender presumption as a
determinative factor in cases about the validity of marriages involving
transgender and intersex people. In 2015, the United States Supreme Court
identified a constitutional right to marry regardless of sex or gender.15 That
decision renders disputes about the validity of marriages involving
transgender or intersex people a matter of historical, rather than active,
concern. Finally, in light of the binary-gender presumption and the relative
significance of medicalization and the positions it has occasioned, Part IV
analyzes the exclusion of transgender and/or intersex people from
bathrooms, locker rooms, and sporting events that conform to their gender
identity.
This choice of issues may be open to criticism for focusing on a series
of concerns that have gained social and legal attention over time, sometimes
at the cost of diverting attention away from other, equally significant
concerns. That choice seems justified in this Article, however, since the
Article reviews legal issues from within the parameters of an
anthropological frame. Thus, the issues on which society and the law have
chosen to focus over time may suggest cultural readiness to entertain
specific issues- at particular moments in time more than they suggest the
issues that are, in fact, most critical to intersex and transgender people.16

14. The term "status" is used here as an alternative to the word "condition" in order to avoid
the suggestion that transgender and intersex people have a "condition" that should subject them to
medical diagnosis and/or treatment.
15. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
16. Thus, exploring those other issues is beyond the scope of this Article, though it is
planned as the focus of a future Article.
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INTERSEX, TRANSGENDER, AND A BINARY-GENDER PRESUMPTION

There are no definitive meanings for the words "transgender" and
"intersex." Even more, various words have been employed to refer to what
this Article refers to as "transgender" or "intersex" people." Section A of
this Part, reviews some of the meanings that have been attached to
"transgender" and "intersex" and related terms. Section B then describes
visions of gender in other cultural settings and compares those views with
the binary approach to gender that has predominated in the United States,
and in the West, more generally.
A.

Definitions, Other Definitions, Biology and Medicalization

In the West, transgender and intersex people have challenged deeply
embedded presumptions about bodies and thus about personhood, families,
and relationships. Transgender status upsets the presumption that sex and
gender are coincident, that they are established at the start of a baby's life,
and that they are immutable. Intersex status upsets the presumption that
people, in the "nature" of the case, must be categorized as either male or
female.
Society has been unforgiving to intersex and transgender populations,
the more either group threatens the binary gender presumption. In certain
contexts, society has viewed intersex people to pose a stronger challenge to
the presumption than transgender people (e.g., efforts to obtain identity
documents that reflect an intersex gender), and in other contexts society has
viewed transgender people as more challenging to the same presumption
(e.g., in questioning rules about bathroom and locker room use, as
determined by sex)."
The very terms "intersex" and "transgender" do not conform with a
binary-gender presumption and has led people to wonder what sex and
gender "really" are. Alice Dreger captured part of this query in her answer
to students (in classes about the history of sex). Dreger's students asked
what sex "really" is:

17. Sometimes other terms suggest somewhat different meanings. David Valentine notes a
number of "identity categories." VALENTINE, supra note 4, at 33; see also infra note 23 and
accompanying text.
18. The fact of transition can threaten society's commitment to a binary gender
categorization, but once a transgender person becomes a member of the "other" gender, that
The
person can be encompassed within a traditional vision of binary-gender categories.
medicalization of intersex during infancy has aimed, often expressly, to hide or obliterate evidence
of a baby's being intersex. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 34, 36
and accompanying text.
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"What really is the key to being male, female, or other?" But, as I tell
them .. . the answer necessarily changes with time, with place, with
technology, and with the many serious implications - theoretical and
practical, scientific and political - of any given answer. The answer is, in
a critical sense, historical - specific to time and place. There is no "back
of the book" final answer to what must count for humans as "truly" male,
female, or hermaphroditic, even though the decisions we make about such
boundaries have important implications.

The first subsection of this Section presents various definitions of both
terms (intersex and transgender). Then, subsection two considers the
particular power of biological presumptions about personhood and some
consequences of medicalizing transgender and intersex people.
1.

Definitions and Other Definitions

Definitions of the terms "Intersex" and "transgender" vary. Scholars,
activists, lawmakers, health care professionals, and public media have
defined the terms variously.
Julie Greenberg offers straightforward
definitions of these and related terms:
Generally, intersexuality refers to a condition in which a person's
biological sex markers are not all clearly male or female, while
transgenderism and transsexuality are used to describe behaviors or
identities of people whose gender expression, gender identity, or both, do
not necessarily conform with the binary sex norm or may be different from
20
the sex assigned to them at birth.

The National Center
"transgender" as:

for

Transgender

Equality

defines

the

term

A term for people whose gender identity, expression or behavior is
different from those typically associated with their assigned sex at birth.
Transgender is a broad term and is good for non-transgender people to
21
use. "Trans" is shorthand for "transgender."

Anthropologist David Valentine has focused on variations in the
meaning of the term "transgender" among activists. The term, he suggests,

19.

ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 9

(1998).
20. Julie A. Greenberg, Health Care Issues Affecting People with an Intersex Condition or
DSD: Sex or Disability Discrimination?,45 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 849, 855 (2012) (citing GLAAD
Media
Reference
Guide
Transgender
Glossary
of
Terms,
GLAAD,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Oct. 27, 2017)).
21. Frequently Asked Questions About TransgenderPeople, supra note 3. A "transgender
man" is defined as someone who "lives as a man today, but was thought to be female when he was
born." Id. A "transgender woman" is defined as someone who "lives as a woman today, but was
thought to be male when she was born." Id.

DISCRIMINATING GENDER

2017]

67

has served to "wrest[ ] control over the meanings and definitions of gender
variance from medical and mental health professionals to replace an
assumption of individual pathology with a series of claims about
citizenship, self-determination, and freedom from violence and
discrimination."22 "Transgender" also serves as an "umbrella" term that
includes a host of other terms, each with its own nuances and variations:
Contemporary activists, providers, and scholars include different kinds of
people in this collective/spectrum/umbrella, and a relatively modest list
would include at least some of the following identity categories:
transsexuals, transvestites, cross-dressers, men or women of transgender
or transsexual experience, drag queens, drag kings, female or male
impersonators, genderqueers, intersexuals, hermaphrodites, fem queens,
girls, boys, trannies, feminine gay men, butch lesbians, male-to-female,
female-to-male, female embodied masculine persons, and even, simply,
men or women. 23

Transgender and intersex status can co-exist in one person. Yet, courts
and lawmakers, much like clinicians, individuals named (by self or others)
as transgender or intersex, and society generally, have struggled to
distinguish one from the other.24 In 1984, the Seventh Circuit distinguished
a "[t]ranssexual" from a "hermaphrodite": "[t]ranssexualism is a condition
that exists when a physiologically normal person (i.e., not a hermaphrodite
- a person whose sex is not clearly defined due to a congenital condition)
experiences discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her
particular sex and prefers to be the other sex." 25 Thus, the court recognized
a clear distinction between transgender and intersex people.
2.

Biology and Medicalization

Definitions of intersexuality, more often than definitions of transgender
status, tend to entail extended consideration of chromosomal and hormonal
factors.26 Contrary to popular belief, intersex people do not have the

22. VALENTINE, supra note 4, at 33.
23. Id. While allowing the term "transgender" to denote "all people who are in some ways
gender-variant," Valentine also posits the continuing need to consider what is "gender-variant"
and who is "transgender." Id. at 37.
24. See Greenberg, supra note 20, at 855.
25. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (deciding a Title
VII claim by transman - referred to by court as a "male transsexual"). The court further
distinguished from these categories both "homosexuals" and "transvestites." See id.
26. See, e.g., DREGER, supra note 19, at 35-43.
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"complete external genitalia" of a man and a woman.2 7 They are more
likely to have what are often referred to as "ambiguous genitalia.""
While identification of a child as intersex can often be made by physical
examination alone, in some cases normal-appearing external genitalia can
hide an internal ambiguity or an anomalous chromosomal sex. As a result,
families and physicians face a dilemma concerning how to treat such
infants. Prior to the advent of modern surgery, such individuals were left
as they were born... . [I]n 16th century England, Lord Coke declared with
respect to the law of inheritance that "a hermaphrodite may be either male
or female, and it shall succeed according to the kind of sex that doth
prevail." 29
Others have resisted medical definitions of intersex. Responding to a
New York Times piece that quoted an "expert on sexual development
disorders," Hida Viloria, an intersex person and advocate, wrote:
Disorder, disorder, disorder. The word spins around in my mind, making

a mockery of my self-esteem. It's as if the New York Times, the "experts"
at the meeting [referred to in the Times article], and everyone who
supported pathologizing me is saying, "Sure, you think you're okay, but
you're oh so very wrong. You are not okay. You need to be treated."o
Intersex activists belonging to the Organization Intersex International
Australia (OIl - Australia) have compiled a list of traits identified with
transgender people as compared with traits identified with intersex people.31
The group associates "trans/gender diverse" people as having "[n]o
ambiguity in innate biological sex characteristics," and associates intersex
people as showing "[n]atural variations in biological sex characteristics
[that] do not match social expectations for female or male bodies."32
Further, transgender people experience differences between "apparent legal
sex assigned at birth" and "self-identified gender," while intersex people are
described as having "physical differences" that "may affect the whole of the
body including genetic, chromosomal and hormonal differences, and
especially sex anatomy."" Among health care professionals, lawmakers,
27.
28.
29.

Hermer, supra note 13, at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
Id.

30.

HIDA VILORIA, BORN BOTH: AN INTERSEX LiFE 235 (2017).

31.

Basic Differences Between Intersex and Trans, ORG. INTERSEX INT'L AUSTL. LTD. (June

3, 2001), https://oii.org.au/18194/differences-intersex-trans/?gclid=CjwKEAjw4IjKBRDr6p752c
CUm3kSJAC-eqRtmzOobOxyUsAr299VZBYFN-ypD4PLwEZKucm_4LQnRoCpGvwwcB.
32. Id.
33. Id. Visit the website to view twenty features identified with trans/gender diverse people
and twenty-two features identified with intersex people. Mainstream assumptions about biology
or even, sometimes, challenges to those assumptions have guided efforts to define the terms
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and the public, a medical focus has consistently attended understandings of
intersex people and, to a lesser extent, of transgender people. Intersex
people have to struggle to avoid medicalized definitions of self,34 even as
many transgender people seek medical and surgical treatment that will
facilitate the process of transitioning.3 5
During the last half of the twentieth century, spurred on, perhaps, by
the work of John Money, advocating for surgery on intersex infants under
the presumption that children's gender identities would conform to
surgically re-shaped genitals,3 6 medical researchers identified a wide variety
of "underlying causes" for intersex.37
Congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and androgen insensitivity
syndrome (AIS), for example, describe atypical adrenal, hormonal and
genetic functions thought to result in the development of intersex features.
Importantly, however, such atypical adrenal, hormonal and genetic
functions do not always produce a visually ambiguous sex, and so the
diagnostic language cannot be thought to refer in any precise way to what
the public now popularly understands as the term "intersex": that is, a
body that confounds in some way the visible, physical features thought to
be exclusively of one sex or the other. 38

"transgender" and "intersex." Similarly, biological assumptions and, in recent years, challenges to
them have undergirded discriminatory responses to women as well as to transgender and intersex
people. "[B]iology or anatomy serve[s] as metaphors for a kind of inferiority that characterizes
society's view of women." And they serve as models against which society has marginalized
those whose bodies or whose sense of their bodies do not harmonize with binary gender
categories.
34. VILORIA, supra note 30, at 234-36. The psychologist John Money popularized the view
that intersex babies should be assigned a gender early and undergo surgical procedures to conform
their external genitalia to the assigned gender. That position was widely accepted and resulted in
genital surgery on many intersex infants and children. See generally JOHN MONEY & ANKE A.
EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY

(Jason Aronson 1996) (1972); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text; DREGER, supra note
19, at 181-82.
35. Shannon Gilreath and Lydia E. Lavelle noted "the recognition of transsexualism as a
medical phenomenon in the 1950s and the relatively widespread access to hormones and sexreassignment surgeries in the 1960s and 70s." SHANNON GILREATH & LYDIA E. LAVELLE,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND IDENTITY: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 428 (2016) (noting that

this medicalization was a "necessary, if not sufficient" factor in the emergence of transgender
people as a political and social community).
36. See generallyMONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 34.
37. This Article uses the term "intersex" as both a noun and as an adjective.
38. Morgan Holmes, The Intersex Enchiridion: Naming and Knowledge, SOMATECHNICS,
Aug. 2011, at 388, 390.
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Such lists suggest that being intersex is not a choice, and they have
encouraged masking intersexuality with surgery and other medical
treatments.39
As recently as 2006, efforts to medicalize intersex people resulted in
the term "Disorders of Sex Development" (DSD).40 The term 41 has been
understood in connection with: "congenital conditions with atypical
development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex." 42 OII - Australia
has criticized this definitional effort, seeing it as replacing human rights
advocacy for intersex people with "medical authority."4 3 Hida Viloria, an
advocate for the intersex community, notes her own preference for the term
"hermaphrodite" because it facilitates her saying "'I'm a hermaphrodite' in
the same way [she has] also said 'I'm a woman."' 44 Yet, other intersex
people dislike the term hermaphrodite because "they don't want to be
identified as this third-gender thing, a hermaphrodite." 4 5 Other activists
have disagreed with Viloria's approach and have preferred medical

39. Some advocates for intersex people suggest that the medicalization of intersex has
allowed medicine to gain control over the lives of intersex people. Barnes, supra note 11 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text. "Claim[ing] [intersex] as a
positive embodied characteristic" occurs simultaneously with "wrest[ing] [intersex] back from its
negative object status as a diagnostic process," advocate Morgan Holmes aims to "cultivate open
and positive identification of and for the intersexed" whereas the "clinical goal" has focused on
"revealing 'true sex'." Holmes, supra note 38, at 391-92. The medical response placed
safeguarding a binary view of gender at the center and offered to control that process through
surgical and endocrinological tools. See id. at 403; see also supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying
text.

40. Christopher P. Houk et al., Summary of Consensus Statement on Intersex Disorders and
Their Management, PEDIATRICS, Aug. 2006, at 753, 753.
41. The term "Disorders of Sex Development" was created and defined by a group that
participated in an invitation-only conference of pediatric endocrinologists ("Intersex Disorders
and Their Management" Conference) in Chicago in 2006. . What is Intersex?, ORG. INTERSEX
INT'L AUSTL. LTD. (Aug. 2, 2013), https://oii.org.au/18106/what-is-intersex/; Holmes, supra note
38, at 388. Morgan Holmes described the term DSD as a threat to "the hard-won right to secure
for ourselves the ability to operate socially without the stamp of 'disorder' or 'disease' strictly
delineating what counts as 'truth' with regard to embodiment." Holmes, supra note 38, at 388.
Later the medical establishment used the acronym DSD as shorthand for "Differences [rather than
Disorders] in Sex Development." Sexual and Gender Minority Health Resources, ASS'N OF AM.
MED. COLLEGES, https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/diversity/1gbthealthresources/ (last visited June
18, 2017) (referring to people who are "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT), gender
nonconforming (GNC), and/or born with differences of sex development (DSD).") Some intersex
advocates reject this term as well insofar as it continues to suggest that being intersex is to "have"
a pathological condition. See VILORIA supra note 30, at 313-14.
42. Houk et al., supra note 40, at 753.
43. What is Intersex?, supra note 41.
44. VtLORIA supra note 30 at 195.
45. Id.
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language such as "Disorders of Sexual Development" (DSD), a term that
forges links with physicians.46
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the medicalization of intersex
people began routinely to result in assigning babies identified as intersex to
one gender or the other and then subjecting infants to surgery to re-shape
their genitals so that they would resemble genitals associated with the
assigned gender as much as possible.47 John Money, a psychologist,
publicized the belief that gender is culturally crafted and could thus be
successfully imprinted if shaped early enough in a child's life.48
Subsequent research has failed to demonstrate that early surgery to re-shape
an intersex child's genitals, accompanied by socialization within the
assigned gender, results in a better or "more 'typical' childhood.49 To the
contrary, surgery to conform the appearance of genitalia to a gender
selected by doctors and/or parents early in a child's life is likely to result in
psychological difficulties that affect the child and the adult that child will
become."o In the view of Suzanne Kessler, decisive and immediate gender
assignment "serves to maintain the credibility of the medical profession,
reassure the parents and reflectively substantiate Money and Ehrhardt's
theory [that either male or female gender can be effectively assigned to any
child regardless of biology].""1 The vast majority (about 90%) of genital
surgical operations on intersex infants or young children aim to make the
child's genitalia female in appearance. 52

46. See id. at 201-02. In Viloria's view, the term DSD "pathologizes intersex people" and
thus "contributes to doctors' efforts to medically 'normalize' us: the very thing we've all been
working against." Id. at 204.
47. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Morgan Holmes has contended that
"narrative credibility, rather than illumination, appears to be the defining concern of the standards
for practice that arose following [John] Money's treatment paradigm." Holmes, supra note 38, at
390. John Money advocated for assigning intersex infants a gender "immediately, decisively,
irreversibly." Id. (quoting Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case
Management ofIntersexed Infants, SIGNS, Autumn 1990, at 3, 8).
48. See Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Strugglefor Intersex and Transsex
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 54 (2006).
49. Arnicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Plaintiff-Appellee M.C. for Affirmance of the
District Court Decision, at 5-6, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App'x 143 (4th Cir.
2015) (Nos. 13-2178(L), 13-2182, 13-2183) [hereinafter AIS-DSD Brief].
50. Id. at 6.
51. Holmes, supra note 38, at 390-91 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Kessler, supra note 47, at 8).
52. AIS-DSD Brief, supra note 49, at 3. The brief further notes that the preference for
creating female genitalia can be attributed to the lower cost and less invasive procedure needed "to
remove a penis and build a vagina than ... to remove female reproductive organs." Id. (citing
Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective
Condemnation of "CulturalPractices,"40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 105 (2005)).
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The case of David Reimer illustrated the worst consequences of
surgery and gender reassignment during infancy or early childhood.
Reimer was born male. After a surgical loss of his penis during infancy,
Reimer was raised as a girl.53 When he was a teenager, Reimer reclaimed
male gender identity. Later, he married a woman and adopted her
children.54 But Reimer's story ended sadly; he eventually killed himself."
The medicalization of transgender status has been less encompassing,
in part because science has not constructed broadly accepted medical
explanations for a divergence between a person's sex at birth and that
person's gender identity. Yet, medical care and legal protections for
transgender people have often been reserved for people willing and able to
mask their "transsexual status and approximate a 'normal' heterosexual
life."56 The notion of "gender identity disorder" was introduced in 1980 in
the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual." The fourth edition of the manual merged two "types"
of transgender status listed separately in DSM-III - transsexualism and
nontranssexualism. In DSM-IV, "gender identity disorder" became the
official diagnosis." The fifth edition of the Manual refers to "gender
dysphoria," rather than "gender identity disorder." Importantly, the DSM-5
description requires that an individual feel distress about having the
"condition"5 9 before that person is deemed to have "gender dysphoria."60

.

53. Ben-Asher, supra note 48, at 68.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 69.
56. GILREATH & LAVELLE, supra note 35, at 428.
57. J. Koh, The History of the Concept of Gender Identity Disorder, 114 SEISHIN
SHINKEIGAKU ZASSHI 673 (2012) (Japan). The translated abstract in English is available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22844818.
58. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-IV, supra note 12, at 537-38. In DSM-IV, the
"diagnostic features" of "gender identity disorder" were described to include "two components . .
both of which must be present to make the diagnosis. There must be evidence of a strong and
persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the
other sex." Id. at 532.
59. Using the term "condition" suggests a medical context. In general, this Article uses
another word - such as "status"-rather than "condition" to avoid the assumption that a medical
matter is necessarily at issue. Here the term condition is used to reflect the wording of the DSM5.
60. Wynne Parry, Gender Dysphoria: DSM-5 Reflects Shift in Perspective on Gender
Identity, HUFFPOST, (June 4, 2013), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/06/04/genderdysphoria-dsm-5_n _3385287.html; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-5, supra note 8. For some, an
advantage of medicalizing transgender status is an increased likelihood that insurers will pay for
surgery and hormone treatments used in transitioning. One study concluded that the costs of
transitioning reflect a "one-time cost" and is not exorbitant and can be "cost-effective" for health
insurance companies. Halland Chen, Sex Reassignment Surgery for Transgenders:Should It Be
Covered by Health Insurance?, HEALTHECONOMICS, http://www.healtheconomics.com/
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DSM-5 explains that the "condition is associated with clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, school or other important areas of
functioning."" In consequence, a person can be transgender and not be
considered to have gender dysphoria, pursuant to the 2013 edition of DSM.
This is a significant move away from compelled medicalization. 62
At one time, psychiatry presumed that there is no convergence between
transgender and intersex people. The fourth edition of the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) defined "gender identity disorder" so that it did
not overlap with "a physical intersex condition." 63 When the fifth edition
replaced the term "gender identity disorder" with "gender dysphoria," it

blog/2016/09/sex-reassignment-surgery-for-transgenders-should-it-be-covered-by-insurance/ (last
visited July 21, 2017).
61. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 452-53. The tone and impact of
DSM-5's characterization of transgender status as a psychiatric, and thus medical issue (if a
transgender individual suffers distress) are not reflected in the vision of transgender people, as
categorized in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) - which excludes transgender people
from coverage. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2010). Far
more concerning, the ADA classifies transgender with behaviors deemed unsavory and with
illegal acts. Section 12211 expressly excludes from conditions referred to by the term "disability"
for purposes of ADA coverage, the following: "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or
Far more disturbing, two additional
other sexual behavior disorders." Id. § 12211(b)(1).
categories of conditions excluded from the ADA's coverage and noted in the same section both
refer to negative behaviors, including "compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania" or
(category 3), "psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs."
Id. § 12211(b)(2).
However, a 2017 case, decided by the district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, concluded that "gender dysphoria" (the term used in DSM-5) is not subject to the
ADA exclusion. Blatt v. Cabela's Retail, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75665, at *1, *5-9, (E.D.
Pa. May 18, 2017). The case, though holding for the transgender litigant, embraces a medical
model. Christopher Czerwonka has confirmed that some disability and transgender rights
advocates have challenged this approach. E-mail from Christopher Czerwonka, to Janet Dolgin
(Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with author).
62. Further, DSM-5 replaces the word "sex" with "gender" to provide for intersex people to
be diagnosed with the condition. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 452-53;
Parry, supra note 60. It is not clear how often, in fact, transgender people are considered not to
have the psychiatric condition labelled "gender dysphoria," pursuant to DSM-5, in cases in which
they assert that they are comfortable that their lived gender differs from their sex at birth.
63. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-IV, supra note 12, at 537-38. The Fourth edition's
"diagnostic criteria for Gender Identity Disorder" include:
(A) A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any perceived
cultural advantages of being the other sex)....
(B) Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender role
of that sex.
(C) The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition.
Id.
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allowed for the possibility that a person may be both transgender and
intersex.64
The medicalization of intersex and transgender people has not been
universal. Other societies have viewed gender and sex more fluidly than
has the United States and have envisioned variations in sex and gender
identity less as matters of medical concern than as expected biological and
social variations.65
B. Visions ofFamily, Gender, Intersex, and Transgender: Culture and
History
A society's understandings of family, gender, reproduction, sex and
relationships (those deemed appropriate and those deemed inappropriate)
almost always reflect that society's deepest presumptions about personhood
and community.
Often, societies voice such presumptions through
reference to "nature." Invocation of "nature" (or equally, for believers, of
divine law, which may or may not be viewed as coincident with nature's
law) generally aims to settle dispute by reference to a vision of truth that is
considered inexorable. Societies, through time and space, have had
different understandings of the natural and the supernatural as well as
different understandings 'of family, gender, reproduction, sex, and
relationships.
In the West, the binary-gender presumption has served to shape and reenforce society's perspective about gender in the broadest terms, leaving
little room for anyone claiming to be a third gender, a fourth gender, or no
specific gender (that is, identifying neither as male nor as female). Even
apparent legal victories by intersex or transgender people have often
depended upon and re-affirmed a binary approach to gender or have
depended on forms of medicalization that do not always or adequately serve
intersex or transgender people. The message expressed in these victories is
that a transgender or intersex litigant can choose to be male or female, but
legal recognition of one's personhood depends on choosing one or the other
- a decision that can be buttressed with medical treatments or surgery.66
The presumptive options-male or female (no fewer, no more)-are at
the heart of Zzyym v. Tillerson (originally Zzyym v. Kerry),67 a case that

64. The Fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013)
replaced "gender identity disorder" with the term "gender dysphoria." See AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 452-53.
65. See infra subsection II.B.1.
66. See Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1108, 1111-14 (D. Colo. 2016).
67. Id.
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involves an intersex person's request to be identified on their" U.S.
passport as "X" (i.e., neither male nor female). That presumption is deeply
ingrained in U.S. culture, though it has met some challenges in the last
several decades. Still, it is often difficult for people to accept the possibility
that a person could belong to a third or fourth gender category or that a
person could transition from one gender to another. 69
This is not the case in all cultures. Before looking at the implications
of shifting views of nature, the capacity of medicine to re-shape nature, as it
were, and the binary-gender presumption in the United States, this Article
reviews visions of gender in societies that have offered a more fluid and
flexible portrait of gender and gender identity than has been the case in the
United States. Subsection one of this Section describes more fluid views of
gender found elsewhere in the world. Subsection two briefly summarizes
the history of the notion of the binary-gender categorization in the West.
1.

Diverse Views About Gender

In TransgenderHistory, Susan Stryker explains:
Historically and cross-culturally, there have been many different systems
of organizing people into genders. Some cultures, including many Native
American cultures, have had three or four social genders. Some attribute
social gender to the work people do rather than to the bodies they live in.
68. Dana Zzyym prefers to be referred to by plural pronouns. Travis M. Andrews, The
Singular, Gender-neutral "they" Added to the Associated Press Stylebook, WASH. POST:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning28,
2017),
(Mar.
MIX
MORNING
mix/wp/2017/03/28/the-singular-gender-neutral-they-added-to-the-associated-pressstylebook/?utm term=.5602381flddf; Corinne Segal, Judge Rules in Favor of Intersex Veteran
Who
Was
Denied
Passport,
PBS
NEWSHOUR,
(Nov.
23,
2016),
That choice is
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/intersex-dana-zzyym-passport-decision/.
respected in this Article.
69. One blog offered responses to a bill in Texas (SB 6) that would have precluded
transgender people from using public bathroom and locker rooms conforming with their gender
identity. Jonathan Tilove, "My HeartBreaks Over Their Deception." On ChristianConservative
Opposition to Transgender Rights, MY STATESMAN: FIRST READING (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://politics.blog.mystatesman.com/2017/03/08/my-heart-breaks-over-their-deception-on-thechristian-opposition-to-transgender-rights/. Tilove quotes a pastor from East Texas as having
said,
[I am surprised] that we even need to consider a bill such as SB 6 to provide for the safety
and protection of our children. Just plain common sense says that biological males should
use the boys' rest room and not have access to the girls' restroom and dressing rooms, and
allowing boys to use the girls' restrooms and dressing rooms is foolish with a capital F and
flies in the face of common sense and decency.
Id. The speaker added, "Jesus said, in the beginning. . . they were created male and female. It's
always been that way." Another spokesperson explained: "Trying to get out of my head the words
transgender, cigender [sic], 'don't call me a he or she pronoun', agender, bigender, and the list
goes on . . .. This was the actual vocabulary of the protestors that testified .....
The speaker,
here, was referring to people who spoke against SB 6. Id.
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In some cultures people can change their social gender based on dreams or
visions. ... [G]ender . . . varies from place to place and culture to culture,
and ... is contingent .. .. This takes us into one of the central issues of
transgender politics - that the sex of the body does not bear any necessary
or deterministic relationship to the social category in which that body
lives. 70

'

In Tahiti and elsewhere in Polynesia, Mahu are "male-bodied persons
of Polynesian descent who have a significant investment in femininity." 7
Acceptance of Mahu, even in Tahiti-and more so in Hawaii-has
diminished since the arrival of Europeans and Americans.7 2 In traditional
French Polynesian society, Mahu have not been marginal socially or
economically. On Tahiti, Mahu have long been allowed to participate in
"traditional adoption arrangements," and play an integral role in Polynesian
economies, though generally in positions associated with women rather
than men - positions such as social work, nursing, and the hospitality
industry.73 In Hawaii, in contrast, many Mahu today "must work the streets
in order to survive."74
Many Native American and Alaska Native societies have provided for
gender variation with the notion of a two-spirit woman.7 5
Two-spirit is a contemporary, unifying, intertribal term adopted by some
AIANs (American Indian, Alaska Natives), First Nations, and Aboriginal
peoples to signify their spiritual, sexual, gender, cultural, and community
identities. Many make use of the two-spirit term by referencing embodied
feminine and masculine duality; a gender identity or expression that does
not fit well into Western notions of a binary gender division, but that is
more aligned with their traditional indigenous understanding of a nonfemale, non-male gender; as a cultural reference of being lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or queer; and/or as having an identity that centers
the spiritual aspect of their identity. 76
The term (two-spirit), in short, reflects the fluidity behind many tribes'
responses to gender and sex. The perspective does not presume a binary
categorization of gender.
70.

SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 11 (2008).

71. Aleardo Zanghellini, Sodomy Law and Gender Variance in Tahiti andHawai'i,2 LAWS
51, 51-52 (2013).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id. at 54-55 (quoting ANDREW MATZNER, 0 AU No KEIA: VOICES FROM HAWAII'S
MAHU AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 284 (2001)).

75. Jessica H. L. Elm et al., "I'm in This World for a Reason": Resilience and Recovery
Among American Indian and Alaska Native Two-spirit Women, 20 J. LESBIAN STUD. 352, 352
(2016).
76. Id. at 353.
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Still, other cultures have recognized gender -variance, though not
always without prejudice, especially in the modem era.77 The South
American travesties are biologically male. Yet, they enjoy female gender
identities. Although once Brazilian travesties were known primarily for
their appearance as women in Carnival parodies, travesties now are often
engaged in sex work.
In India, the hijra communities of intersex and transgender people have
faced significant prejudice in modem society.o Traditionally, however,
hijras enjoyed religious respect. 8' And even today hijras are called on to
offer blessings at births and marriages. 82 Respect paid to hijras diminished
with the British colonization of India." However, in 2014, the Supreme
Court of India offered some protection to hijras by recognizing a legal third
gender. It was expected that that recognition would allow hijras to obtain
jobs with the government more easily and to gain admission to college.84
Recently, some European countries have implemented laws that respect
peoples' gender identities regardless of their sex." In 2015, the government
of Malta enacted a statute that provides far-reaching protections to
transgender and intersex people." This law-the Gender Identity, Gender
Expression and Sex Characteristics Act (GIGESC) provides:
77. Marcos R.V. Garcia & Yvette Piha Lehman, Issues Concerning the Informality and
Outdoor Sex Work Performed by Travestis in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 40 ARCH. SEX BEHAV. 1211,
1211 (2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Jefferson Mok & Stephanie Linning, Hidden World of the Hitras:Inside India's 4,000year-old Transgender Community Where Religious Respect Doesn't Protect Them from Modern5:28
EDT),
30,
2015,
MAIL,
(June
DAILY
day
Discrimination,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2852834/Hidden-world-hijras-Inside-India-s-4-000-yearold-transgender-community-religious-respect-doesn-t-protect-modern-day-discrimination.html.
8 1. Id.
82. Homo Khaleeli, Hijra: India's Third Gender Claims Its Place in Law, THE
GUARDIAN, (Apr. 16, 2014, 14:37 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/
apr/16/india-third-gender-claims-place-in-law.
83. Id.
84. Id. Some hijras prefer to be known as male or female (the gender of their identity) rather
than as part of a third gender. Id. A Pakistani woman who ran for a provincial office in Pakistan
reported that recognition of hijras in Pakistan has not significantly diminished discrimination
against hijras. Id. In fact, prejudice against hijras in India lingered even after the 2014 Indian
Supreme Court ruling. However, in 2017, a government owned train network in Kerala hired
about two-dozen hijras. Id.
85. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
86. Malta Adopts Ground-breaking Trans and Intersex Law - TGEU Press Release,
TRANSGENDER EUROPE (Apr. 1, 2015), http://tgeu.org/malta-adopts-ground-breaking-transintersex-law; Elena Cherubim, Transgender Women Hired by Government-owned Indian Rail for
PM),
5:33
2017,
(May
15,
NEWS
PINK
Time,
the
First

SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW

78

[Vol. 47
-

(1) All persons being citizens of Malta have the right to
(a) the recognition of their gender identity;

(b) the free development of their person according to their gender identity;
(c) be treated according to their gender identity and, particularly, to be
identified in that way in the documents providing their identity therein;
and
(d) bodily integrity and physical autonomy.8 7

Even more, the Act provides that the "right to gender identity" does not
depend on showing "proof of a surgical procedure for total or partial genital
reassignment, hormonal therapies or any other psychiatric, psychological or
medical treatment. . . ."" GIGESC imposes a fine on anyone who
"knowingly expose[s] any person who has availed of the provisions of this
Act, or shall insult or revile a person" 89 and on anyone who "violates any of
the provisions of this Act."90
In 2016, Norway became the fourth European nation to provide legal
recognition to a person's gender in conformity with gender identity without
requiring the submission of medical evidence.9 1 The others are Denmark,
Malta, and Ireland.9 2 The Norwegian law applies to all people over six
years of age.93 In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights responded to
countries that compel sterilization as a prerequisite for being legally
recognized as belonging to the gender that conforms with a person's gender
identity in cases in which that gender differs from one's biological sex. 94
The Court concluded that the requirement was a violation of human rights. 95
European nations must conform their laws to this ruling. 6 However, the
court did not preclude nations from requiring a medical examination or a
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/05/16/transgender-women-hired-government-owned-indian-railfirst-time/.
87. Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act, § 3(1) - (3) (Act No.
XI of 2015) (Malta) [hereinafter GIGESC].
88. Id. § 4.
89. Id. § 11.
90. Id.
91. J. Lester Feder, Norway is the Latest Country to Make Life Way Easierfor Transgender
People, BUZZFEEDNEWS, (June 3, 2016, 12:19 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/
norway-will-soon-let-you-change-your-official-gender-withju?utmjterm-.av89Y7gXK3#.utM8nqa7LB.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Transgender Europe Human Rights Victory! European Court of Human Rights Ends
Forced Sterilisation, TRANSGENDER EUROPE (Apr. 6, 2017), http://tgeu.org/echrendsterilisation/.
95. Id.

96. Id.

2017]

DISCRIMINATING GENDER

79

psychiatric diagnosis before providing for a change in gender on identity
documents.9 7
2.

Gender in the West Over Time: the Binary Presumption

In the United States and elsewhere in the West, the binary-gender
presumption has been central to visions of personhood, social roles, and
family statuses and obligations for many centuries. Mostly, it has been
taken-for-granted and thus virtually never challenged. However, in concert
with changes in society's perspectives about personhood, family
relationships, and gender more generally, especially during the last century,
some challenges to the binary-gender presumption are being voiced.98 This
section briefly summarizes understandings of gender in the West at a few
points in time since the Medieval world. During the Middle Ages, gender
roles and statuses grounded in gender separated men from women in many
domains of life. Slowly, gender status became less central to everyday life,
and gender roles became more flexible. That process, described in
summary form here, was a precursor to the recognition and increasing
acceptance of transgender and intersex people in the twenty-first century.
In the Medieval world, gender was clear-cut and central to one's role
and status in familial and public life. Georges Duby described private life
in the Medieval world to include a "private sphere," generally represented
geographically as a home or a community of homes, enclosed by a wall. 99
This space enclosed private property, "including reserves of food and
clothing and livestock," as well as "those human beings not counted as part
of the populus-males too young to [participate in the life of adult men];
women; minors; and the nonfree of both sexes and all ages." 1" Thus, status
distinctions governed private life as well as public life (since minors, young
boys, women, and nonfree people were beholden to their head of household
or to public authorities even in areas outside the private domain). 101 To be a
97. Id. (noting that "the Court denied that forced medical examinations ordered by the
national court (E. Garcon v. France) or a mental health diagnosis (A.P. v. France) contradict the
Convention").
98. Id.
99. Georges Duby, Introduction: Private Power, Public Power, in 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 1, 12 (Georges Duby ed., Arthur Goldhammer

trans., 1988).
100. Id. at 12-13.
101. Id. at 12-14. Boys, minors, women, and nonfree people were under public authority's
rule only,
1. If they ventured outside the enclosure into public territory, roads, or places and were not

accompanied by either the head of the household or other free men of the family; in such
cases they were classed with aliens, and it was up to the magistrate, as surrogate for paternal
authority, to oversee their "conduct" and maintain discipline;
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man or a woman was to be categorized as essentially different, each from
the other. A social division between genders was "institutionalized" in a
manner that affected most aspects of life.102 Yet, long before Western legal
systems openly considered the rights of transgender and intersex people,
women began to play a more significant role in the public sphere,
previously reserved for men, and the role of women in the private sphere of
home and hearth broadened as well. In the nineteenth century, changes in
visions of family brought new flexibility to family life for men and for
women. 103 Further, the entry of women into the modern capitalist
marketplace of wage labor, though often oppressive in its consequences,
can be viewed as a "first step toward autonomy for women."1 04 Moreover,
in the last six decades of the nineteenth century, every state in the U.S.
passed some form of married women's property acts, relieving women from
laws that transferred a woman's property to her husband upon marriage.o
Ironically, a nineteenth century obsession with the role and presumed
marginality of single women, reflected, in fact, the end of an age that
presumed that women belonged at home, subject to the rule of their
husbands or fathers. Cecile Dauphi suggests that "single women somehow
crystallized all the fears of women's autonomy - sexual, social, economic,
and intellectual."' 0 6 Nineteenth century society had become obsessed with
the image of the "spinster."
Virago, lesbian, amazon, whore, grisette, bluestocking - these pejoratives
for single women have no real foundation and are ubiquitous in Western
culture. But the literary figure of the spinster and the popularization of the
stereotype were the work of the nineteenth century. 107

2. When the head of household was absent and no free adult male capable of protecting the
minors of the "family" was available; it was the original function of the king, which he
delegated to his agents, to take care of widows and orphans; and
3. The authority of the magistrate could be expressly invoked by an appeal, a complaint,
known as the clamor or "hue and cry"; the grievance was thus made public, and the guilty
parties turned over to communal authorities.
Id.
102. Georges Duby et al., Portraits,in 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE
MEDIEVAL WORLD 80 (Georges Duby ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1988).
103. Genevieve Fraisse, A PhilisophicalHistory of Sexual Difference, in 4 A HISTORY OF
WOMEN: EMERGING FEMINISM FROM REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR 48, 71 (Genevieve Fraisse
& Michelle Perrot, eds., Arthur Goldhammer, trans., 1993).
104. Id. at 66.
105. Married Women's Property Acts Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/married-womens-property-acts/ (last visited July 3, 2017).
106. Cecile Dauphin, Single Women, in 4 A HISTORY OF WOMEN: EMERGING FEMINISM
FROM REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR 427, 442 (Genevieve Fraisse & Michelle Perrot, eds., Arthur
Goldhammer, trans., 1993).
107. Id. at 441.
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Images of the single woman - the woman who lived without a man echoed,
even as they appeared to distain, modernity's increasing acceptance of
women in the world of work as well as that of home: the notion of the
single woman "reveals. . . the grammar of Western 'modernity,' which has
been characterized by 'a plurality of forms of individualism corresponding
to a like plurality of forms of sociability."'"os We see here an early and
peculiar shift in the binary-gender perspective - a fragmenting of images
within the gender "woman." That process foreshadows by a century a
fragmentation of images of gender as a domain that contains "males" and
"females" but no other options.
Women were increasingly granted civil rights during the nineteenth
century. Yet, each development that brought women greater access to a
world previously populated only by men also brought fears about
abandoning the "natural" order.109 Emile Zola's observed that women had
become free to "fill the man's role in every way and everywhere.""1 0 Yet,
that development, Zola explained, reflected self-mutilation, "denying
desire, setting oneself apart from life? ... Thus the natural order soon
reasserted itself and peace was made between reconciled sexes, each one
finding its happiness in the happiness of the couple.""' Still, shifts in
perspective witnessed by the nineteenth century spawned a new reality by
the second half of the twentieth century - one that included re-shaped
images of marriage, reproduction, and gender. By the 1970s, a view of
family that facilitated autonomous choice within the domestic sphere for
men and for women displaced a nineteenth century view of families as
enduring units defined by status relationships (based primarily on age and
gender).1 12 The law acknowledged that momentous change."
Changes in family organization do not signal abandonment of the
binary-gender perspective. But they do suggest realigned images of each

&

108. Id. at 442 (quoting Serge Moscovici, L'Individu et ses representations, 264 Magazine
litteraire 28 (1989)).
109. Annelise Maugue, The New Eve and the Old Adam, in 4 A HISTORY OF WOMEN:
EMERGING FEMINISM FROM REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR 515, 516 (Genevieve Fraisse
Michelle Perrot, eds., Arthur Goldhammer, trans., 1993).
110. Id. at 516 (quoting Amile Zola, TRAVAIL 487, Vol. 2 (1901, 1906)).
111. Id. (quoting trmile Zola, TRAVAIL 487, Vol. 2 (1901, 1906)).
112. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1535 (1994) (noting that by 1970s half of marriages in the United
States ended in divorce; and only a third of families were composed of two parents of opposite
genders and their minor children).
113. Id. at 1561. Provision for no-fault divorce, cohabitation contracts, and pre-nuptial
agreements depended upon recognition of spouses and cohabitants as independent people, not
inexorably tied together by nature's presumptive dictates or by traditional understandings of
families as small social worlds defined through relationships of status. Id.
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gender's appropriate role - images that reflect more varied understandings
of "woman" and "man." That realignment facilitated greater social
acceptance to women who entered into a previously "male" marketplace,
who increasingly dressed in styles once associated only with men (e.g.,
pants), and who took on leadership roles (not only in the marketplace but in
schools, sports, and communal groups) that had previously been closed to
them. Yet, women remained the marked gender, and social acceptance for
men entering into jobs once viewed as "female" and dressing in colors and
styles previously associated with women has come about more slowly and
with more hesitation. 114
Susan Stryker has described the emergence of a "transgender aesthetic"
in the U.S. in the 1970s.11 1 This did not immediately coincide with greater
openness to transgender people within mainstream society, though in the
late 1960s and 1970s, it became possible, essentially for the first time, for
transgender people to receive medical care to change their sex to reflect
gender identity.1 16 Yet, even that development supported a binary approach
to gender. Stryker reported:
[t]he new university-based scientific research programs were far more
concerned with restabilizing the gender system, which seemed to be
mutating all around them in bizarre and threatening directions, than they
were in helping that cultural revolution along by further exploding
mandatory relationships between sexed embodiment, psychological
gender identity, and social gender role. 117

Thus, despite increased availability of genital surgery in the U.S. for
transgender people by the 1960s and 1970s, medical categorizations
encouraged "compliance with overtly homophobic and sexist standards.""'
Medical treatment of transmen and transwomen facilitated their assimilation
within binary-gender categories, and thus, in that regard, their social
disappearance.

114.

Susan Chira, Men Don't Want to Be Nurses. Their Wives Agree, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,

2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/opinion/sunday/men-dont-want-to-be-nurses-theirwives-agree.html?_r-0 (noting that "notions of masculinity die hard"); David Vlahov & Molly C.
Spurlock, Letters to the Editor, Beyond the Stereotype: The Nurse Is a Man, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION
LETTERS (July 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/opinion/beyond-the-stereotype-thenurse-is-a-man.html (noting society's comfort, despite some pushback, with men in nursing
positions).
115. STRYKER, supra note 70, at 91.
116. Id. at 93 (noting that previously it was necessary to travel abroad to receive reassignment surgery).

117.
118.

Id. at 93-94.
GILREATH & LAVELLE, supra note 35, at 428.
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By the 1990s, however, the term "transgender" began to serve as "a
catchall phrase for all nonnormative forms of gender expression and
identity," and the transgender community"' evolved and grew. 120 By the
twenty-first century, mainstream society in the United States had begun to
assimilate and accept transgender people.12 1 Mass media portrayed
transgender people with less prejudice than had been the case. 122 Legal
victories followed from the activism of transgender organizations.' 23
The same decades saw the emergence of an "intersex political
movement."' 24 The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), created in
1993, challenged the practice of performing genital surgery on infants and
young children.125 In earlier times, considerable confusion existed in
society and among physicians about intersex people (often referred to as
hermaphrodites).126 Even in the second half of the twentieth century, when
physicians had knowledge of the role of hormones and chromosomes in
sex, they focused on "external genitalia" in responding to intersex people.1 27
John Money,' 28 the psychologist associated with the institutionalization and
justification of genital surgery on intersex infants and young children
concluded:
[t]he chromosomal sex should not be the ultimate criterion, nor should the
gonadal sex. By contrast, a great deal of emphasis should be placed on the
morphology of the external genitals and the ease with which those organs
can be surgically reconstructed to be consistent with the assigned sex. 129
Historian Elizabeth Reis noted that this approach "has had lasting
negative consequences." 30 Some intersex activists today advocate for the
end of "the institutionalized 'medicalization' of intersex people" and for
denotation of genital surgery on intersex infants and children as a human
rights violation.' 31 Yet, intersex people who openly reject the binary119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra note 4 (commenting on use of word "community").
STRYKER, supra note 70, at 123.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 14849.
Id. at 138.
Id.

126.

See Elizabeth Reis, Impossible Hermaphrodites:Intersex in America, 1620-1960, 92 J.

OF AM. HIST. 411, 411-12 (2005).
127. Id. at 440.
128. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
129. At that time, the term "hermaphrodite" was used widely to refer to intersex people. Reis,
supra note 126, at 440 (quoting John Money et al., Imprinting and the Establishment of Gender
Role, 77 AMA ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 333, 334 (1957)).
130. Reis, supra note 126, at 440.
131. VILORIA, supra note 30, at 266.
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gender prerogative face significant challenges. Hida Viloria, an engaged
intersex person and lesbian, explained to a friend:
"[G]irls always like me more one way or the other, pretty or handsome,
you know? And then when I switch [from appearing more female or male
to appearing more as the other] it bugs them, but no matter how hard I've
tried to pick one, it just doesn't work. After a while I want to look like the
other again. It's like I'm both, but I don't know how to be that, or if
anyone's ever going to be into it. . . ."132

Viloria's self-analysis reveals the challenge facing intersex people who
aspire to identify positively and openly with their gender identity.
II.

"I DON'T KNOW How To BE THAT" 133 : A NEW GENDER

OR No

GENDER

Hida Viloria, intersex and pro-active, writes about her own struggle to
construct an identity that did not reflect a binary division of genders. Dana
Alix Zzyym, certain that their intersex body rendered theml34 "neither male
nor female",' argued for the right to identify themself on their passport
through a third gender category. Viloria, who worked with Zzyym at
Organization Intersex International - USA (011 - USA), reported "an
immediate sense of understanding" 36 when she first met Zzyym:
It's been years now since I came to realize that, although I know what it's
like to live as a woman and as a man, in the core of my being I am neither.
I am a herm, just like Dana. I'm a hermaphrodyke, to be exact: a herm
137
who was raised as a woman and loves women.

Both Zzyym, who chooses to be referred to by the pronouns they/them/and
their, and Viloria are discomforted by the many intersex people who chose
to identify through the binary gender scheme. 13 8
A.

Intersex PassportIdentity

In 2015, Dana Zzyym sued the U.S. Department of State because the
Department denied them the right to obtain a passport without identifying

132.
in 1999.
133.
134.
Zzyym.
135.

Id. at 145. The book's chronological organization suggests that Viloria took this position
Id.
Again, this article reflects Zzyym's preference for use of plural pronouns to refer to
See Andrews, supra note 68.
VILORIA, supra note 30, at 303.

136. Id.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 302, 304.
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themself as male or female.' 39 The government's response to Zzyym
reflects, a strict, though largely unexamined, commitment to the binary
gender perspective.140 it also reflects apparent indifference to an applicant's
sex or gender identity - or to a presumption of harmony between the two
so long as the applicant does not resist being categorized as either female or
male. More particularly, the Department of State has taken contrasting
positions in response first, to intersex people seeking to be acknowledged as
such, and second, to transgender people requesting to have their gender
identity acknowledged on their passports. 141 The first group threatens the
binary-gender presumption more than the second. In Zzyym v. Kerry,1 42 the
government stated explicitly that its primary interest in rejecting requests
from intersex people to be recognized through a gender other than female or
male has been its interest in safeguarding a binary system for categorizing
gender.1 43
Zzyym supported their claim to be neither male nor female with
medical evidence and contended that marking a box on the passport
application confirming "M" (male) or "F" (female) gender would have been
to have lied to the State Department. 14 4 Zzyym's Complaint defines Zzyym
as "born intersex, with ambiguous external sex characteristic [and notes
that] the sex field on Dana's birth certificate was initially left blank."l 45
Zzyym is a veteran of the U.S. military. Medical reports from the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs attested to Zzyym's intersex status. 146
Sometime after Zzyym's birth, their parents, in consultation with
physicians, decided Zzyym should be raised as a male.1 47 Their1 48 birth
certificate was then completed, categorizing Zzyym as male. As a young

139. See generally Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Colo. 2016).
140. See infra notes 142-43, 158-60, 171-72, 174 and accompanying text.
141. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1109, 1113.
142. See generally id. at 1106.
143. See id at 1113-14.
144. Transcript of Hearing on Pending Motions at 13, Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106
(D. Colo. 2016) (No. 15-cv-02362-RBJ) [hereinafter Zzyym Hearing].
145. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief at 4, Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F.
Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Colo. 2016) (No. 1:15-cv-2362) [hereinafter Zzyym Complaint].
146. Zzyym Hearing, supra note 144, at 28.
147. Zzyym Complaint, supra note 145, at 5.
148. Again, this summary conforms with Zzyym's preference for plural pronouns. See supra
note 68. This Article follows the pronoun preference of each person mentioned insofar as that
preference is known. Sometimes that results in awkward grammatical constructions. Until a
reasonable option (e.g., zhe, per) is accepted among English speakers, the grammatical
awkwardness is the mechanism through which to respect individuals' gender identity and lived
sex.
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child, surgery was performedl4 9 on them to "make Dana's body conform to
binary sex stereotypes.""so Surgery left Zzyym with irreversible physical
changes but, still, a patently "intersex nature."s1 Raised as a boy, Zzyym
lived as a woman for some period after their army service. Later, they
"came to understand that living as a woman was not right either."l52
Zzyym's complaint asserted that the Department of State's denying
them the right to apply for a passport reflecting a third gender category was
"arbitrary and capricious" and thus violated the Administrative Procedure
Act,153 and that it was a violation of constitutional principles that protect
equality and liberty.154 Zzyym's complaint asserted that gender identity
forms ''a core aspect of individual self-definition" and that "Defendant's
Policy as applied to Plaintiff impermissibly interferes with the most
intimate choices a person may make in a lifetime, including Plaintiff s right
to existence and self-expression as a person who identifies neither as male
nor female."s5
Judge Jackson declined to entertain the constitutional issues at stake
since, in his view, it was necessary to consider the Plaintiff s allegation that
the agency action was "arbitrary and capricious": 15 6
I find that the administrative record contains no evidence that the
Department followed a rational decisionmaking process in deciding to
implement its binary-only gender passport policy. Therefore, the proper
next step is to remand the case to the Department to give it an opportunity
either to shore up the record, if it can, or reconsider its policy. 157
Testimony offered to the court by the government indicated that the
government's interest in sustaining a binary gender system is so important
that the government encouraged intersex applicants to fabricate a gender
Not answering the
identity that complied with the binary system.15
form
or
answering without
question about sex on a passport application

149.

Zzyym Complaint, supra note 145, at 5.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 6.
153. Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1109 (D. Colo. 2016) (noting that Zzyym argued
that the State Department's denying them the right to a passport application violated the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
154. Zzyym Complaint, supra note 145, at 2. The Complaint further grounded the suit in the
Department's acting "in excess of statutory jurisdiction and authority" and "not in accordance
with law." Id.
155. Zzyym Complaint, supra note 145, at 16.
156. Zzyym,220F.Supp.3datllll.
157. Id.
158. Zzyym Hearing, supra note 144, at 13-15.
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identifying oneself as "M" or "F" precludes receipt of a passport and thus
makes it virtually impossible to leave the United States.`9
Ryan Parker, a lawyer for the Department of Justice invoked the
Passport Act of 1926 in responding to the court's queries about the
"reasons" for the government's insistence that Zzyym define themself
officially as male or female as a prerequisite for receiving a passport.160
That Act, the court noted, was 90 years old and reflective of the concerns of
a different era. Judge Jackson elaborated:
Things have changed a lot in the last 90 years. Things are changing as we
speak. We've all seen just in recent jurisprudence the Supreme Court
recognize the right of gay people. We have this whole issue that's being
discussed and even litigated about transsexual people. And now we've got
a different category, intersex people. 161
Still, Parker made it clear that Zzyym was free to identify on the
application form as either "F" (in line with Zzyym's driver's license) 162 or,
with appropriate documentation, to change Zzyym's official gender and
identify as "M." Zzyym was not, however, free to declare what to Zzyym,
and apparently to the court, 163 was the truth - that Zzyym could not
accurately be defined as either "M" or "F." Judge Jackson wondered what
options exist for intersex people seeking passports.
Now, your State Department, our State Department tells these people they
can't submit false information on a passport application. That's a big nono. You can't do that. It's illegal. But this person doesn't identify with
and doesn't have genitalia, even, that correspond with one or the other.16
Here Parker struggled to justify State Department policy:

159. Id.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Zzyym's attorney, Paul Castillo, noted that the driver's license is not universally
accepted as determinative evidence of gender:
. . the State Department's own foreign affairs manual . .. actually recognizes that state law
and foreign laws may vary as to whether driver's license or other forms of identification such
as a state driver's license is consistent or inconsistent with a person who is applying for a
passport application; case in point with respect to individuals who are transgender oftentimes
are unable to have insufficient financial resources to change either their birth documentation
or their state documentation, but yet, despite that inconsistency, the State Department has a
policy that allows a transgender individual to apply on the passport form with the gender
marker that's different from their underlying documents.
Id. at 26-27. Castillo's response here suggests the centrality of a binary approach to sex
identification. It would seem that the State Department is less concerned with the form of
documentation offered to show identity than with the preservation of a binary approach to gender
and sex.
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id.
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It [a passport] is not, for example, the plaintiffs document. This is a
document that the government uses for specific purposes. And one of
those purposes is that when a passport holder crosses the borders of the
United States, the State Department uses a computerized system to link
that person with critical law-enforcement information. The information
that is input into this system from various law-enforcement agencies [that]
only identifies individuals as male or female. And the sex identifier that
the government uses on the government document is important for linking
individuals to relevant law-enforcement information. 165
Judge Jackson wondered how the government could at once invoke lawenforcement needs as justification for its binary-sex policy but still allow an
applicant to claim one gender even when "state identification documents
(and perhaps law enforcement database records?)" categorized the applicant
as belonging to the other gender. 166 The government had not (and perhaps
could not) explain how it presumed to "sync a transgender individual's
passport information with law enforcement records that might list that very
same passport holder as the opposite sex" and yet claimed that it could not
achieve a similar end for intersex people unwilling to be classified as
female or male.1 67
Judge Jackson observed that the record did not
demonstrate through reference to law enforcement needs that its binarygender passport policy served a rational end.16 1
Further, the judge summarized the consequences for Zzyym and others
like Zzyym:
[T]his person with the ambiguous genitalia, who is neither male or female,
can't leave the country because you have to have the passport to get out
legally, can't leave the county unless they lie. And by lie, they check "F"
or they check "M." Either one, as long as they check one, government
doesn't care which one. Check one, fine. Don't check one, you're
stuck. 169

The court asked Parker if the Department had a policy regarding
passport sex identification for transgender people.
Parker responded
positively and described that policy as "very progressive." He explained
that the Department may issue a passport to a person who has submitted
medical documentation "saying that the individual has gone through the

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 13-14.
Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (D. Colo. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Zzyym Hearing, supra note 144, at 14-15.
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clinical treatment necessary to transition. . ." even if that passport indicates
a sex that "differs from some of their identification documentation."l 7 0
Then, however, when asked about the State Department's policy for
sex identification on an intersex person's passport, Parker asserted that "the
change from a binary system would be extremely disruptive for the
Department. . . ."' In attempting to explain this position, Parker, in effect,
reiterated it:
Your Honor, I certainly concede that the Department could [have an
additional category or categories reflecting sex on a passport form]. But
that would upend the process that they have in place for verifying
identity . . It really comes back to the traditional binary that we see
throughout our society. And I understand Your Honor's view that that
binary may be outdated, but the State Department as it looks at the way
that it uses the passport, the way that it uses it to identify the individual
and especially the way that it uses it when individuals try to use passports
to cross the borders of the United States, that binary is still very important
because it's a key piece of identifying information. 172
In May 2017, the Department of State asserted that it had reviewed its
"binary-only gender passport policy," as directed by Judge Jackson, and
again denied Zzyym a passport that would have identified Zzyym as other
than male or female.173 In June 2017, Judge Jackson agreed to consider the
constitutionality of the State Department rule requiring passport applicants
to identify as male or female.17 4
B.

TransgenderPassportIdentity and State ID

The federal government's insistence on preserving a binary gender
categorization has different consequences for transgender and for intersex
people.
A transgender person able to submit supporting medical
documentation can be identified on a U.S. passport in conformity with his
or her gender identity.175 In contrast, an intersex person, who identifies
neither as "F" nor as "M" or who identifies as male and female is required
170.

Id at 21.

17 1.

Id.

172. Id. at 22.
173.

Keith Coffman, U.S. Judge Reopens Case of Colorado "Intersex" Veteran Denied

Passport, REUTERS NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-coloradointersex/judge-reopens-case-of-colorado-intersex-veteran-denied-passport-idUSKBN19J00W.
174. Id. Zzyym's petition for review was not opposed by the Department of State. Id. The
case is now referred to as Zzyym v. Tillerson. LAMBDA LEGAL, Zzyym v. Tillerson (formerly
Zzyym v. Kerry), https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/co-zzyym-v-tillerson (last visited
Oct. 15, 2017).
175. Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1113 (D. Colo. 2016).
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to lie or to refrain from travel outside of the United States. As noted,17 1 the
government's attorney in Zzyym concluded his testimony before Judge
Jackson by applauding the State Department's "progressive policy with
regard to transgender individuals."l 77 That line of argument presents a
curious disconnect between apparent pride about having a flexible view of
gender and entrenched commitment to a binary view of gender.
Transgender people have also struggled to have their gender recorded
in accordance with their gender identity on governmental identity
documents. But their struggle has differed from that of intersex people in
that the possibility of changing one's gender identity within the binarygender framework is less often at issue today than is the possibility of
identifying as part of more than one gender group or as belonging to no
gender.
The federal government's policy has provided support to transgender
litigants in cases challenging rules about changes in gender identity on
state-issued documents such as drivers' licenses. In 2010, Michigan
Secretary of State Ruth Johnson implemented a policy requiring anyone
seeking to alter gender on state ID to present an amended birth certificate.'7
This posed problems for transgender people born in states that will not
provide amended birth certificates, indicating a person's "lived gender,"
rather than sex at birth.' 79 Moreover, Michigan precluded reliance on a
passport as evidence of gender for purposes of altering state documents."so
Other states predicate a change in gender on a person's birth certificate on
the applicant's having had gender reassignment surgery.
A group of transgender people challenged Michigan's policy.s1
Plaintiffs contended that being compelled to rely on official identification
documents that did not reflect their appearance intruded on privacy by
"indirectly divulg[ing] their transgender status to complete strangers" and
put them at risk of harm.182 In Love v. Johnson, Judge Edmunds for the
U.S. district court summarized the plaintiffs' concerns:
176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
177. Zzyym Hearing, supra note 144, at 55.
178. Love v. Johnson, No. 15-11834, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112035, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
23, 2016).
179. Id. at *1-2.
180. Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2015). But see Love, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112035, at *2, *4 (noting that Michigan provided for reliance on U.S. passport to
show gender after commencement of Love).
181. Love, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112035 (granting defendant's motion to dismiss in light of
change in state policy). Other states predicate a change in gender on a person's birth certificate on
the applicant's having had gender reassignment surgery. Id. at *2.
182. Love, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 850.
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Under the Policy, then, transgender individuals must procure an amended
birth certificate in order to obtain a new state ID. Plaintiffs maintain that
this requirement places "onerous and in some cases insurmountable
obstacles to prevent transgender persons from correcting the gender on
driver's licenses and state IDs ...
[and] stands in contrast with the
decisions of the federal government and numerous states to ease
restrictions on changing gender on identity documents ......
Indeed,
according to Plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of State only requires a
doctor's certification that a person "has had appropriate clinical treatment
for gender transition" to change the gender on his or her passport.
Likewise, "[a]t least 25 of the States and the District of Columbia do not
require a transgender person to undergo surgery to change the gender" on
their state ID. 183
Judge Edmonds denied Johnson's motion to dismiss, concluding that
the state's policy "directly implicated Plaintiffs' fundamental right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment." 184 Four months after the court's
decision, the state amended its policy to provide for a gender change on a
driver's license based on production of an amended birth certificate, a U.S.
passport, a U.S. Passport Card, or a court order showing that a sex change
had gained legal recognition.' As a result, the district court concluded that
there no longer was "'a live controversy' between the parties.""' Although
the plaintiffs in Love opposed the court's summary judgment for the
defendant - even in light of the policy change announced by the state - the
case shows, again, that at least during the first decade-and-a-half of the
twenty-first century, it often proved easier for transgender people than for
intersex people to gain gender recognition. The binary gender presumption
has continued to constrain the requests of intersex people for legal
recognition of their intersexuality.
III. MARRIAGE AND GENDER BEFORE OBERGEFELL'
A different pattern emerged during the last half of the twentieth century
in legal responses to questions about the permissibility or existence of
marriages involving transgender and intersex people.'
At least in part,
183. Id. at 851.
184. Love, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112035, at *2.
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id. at *12-13.
187. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (upholding right to marry for
same-sex couples).
188. Many of the conundrums that courts faced in these cases were resolved by the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges. See id. (recognizing constitutional right of
same-gender couples to marry).
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that difference reflects the implications of medicalization. This Part
considers judicial responses in the U.S. and Britain to disputes that
questioned the validity of a marriage in which a partner was intersex or
transgender.
A set of British cases, decided in the second half of the twentieth
century reflect the force of the binary gender presumption as well as
differences in consequences that that presumption may hold for transgender
and intersex people.189 In 1963, a British court validated a marriage
between an intersex woman and a man.1 90 The wife had been born with
vaginal atresia, resulting in a short vaginal passage.1 91 She had agreed to
surgery to "remove the impediment that existed to full penetration by her
husband." 192 The husband contended that this could not provide a "true
vagina." The court refused to annul the marriage. Apparently assuming
that the wife was a female at birth, the court concluded as well that a reconstructed vagina was a "real" vagina and that the husband lacked grounds
to annul the marriage.1 93
Corbett v. Corbett, decided in Britain in 1970, involved a marriage
between a cisgender male and a transwoman. 194 Judge Omrod in Corbett

189. See, e.g., Wv. W. [2001] Fam. 111 at Ill (Eng.); Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P 83 at 10708; S.Y. v. S.Y., [1963] P 37 at 61 (Eng.).

190.
191.
192.

See S.Y, [1963]P37 at 61.
See id.
Id. at 38.

193. Judge Karminski grounded that decision in the likelihood that the wife's reconstructed
vagina would provide the husband with "a large degree of [sexual] satisfaction." Id. at 42. The
lower court opinion is included in that of the Court of Appeal. Even in considering the wife's
potential sexual satisfaction should she submit to vaginal reconstruction, that court focused,
instead, on the husband's potential satisfaction:
It is suggested [the husband's] satisfaction would be limited by the fact that the woman was
deriving little if any pleasure from [sexual intercourse], but again the consultant took the
view that, although probably the woman would not have quite the same satisfaction as she
would do if she was normal and had an ordinary vagina, she would get pleasurable sensations
which would in turn communicate themselves to the husband.
Id. In short, the wife's pleasure, to the extent that she received any, was viewed as important for
the added pleasure it might bring to the husband. See id. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the husband's annulment petition: "In these circumstances, I am not
persuaded that the judge came to a wrong conclusion when he declined to hold that this wife was
incapable of consummating the marriage." Id. at 61. For Judge Wilmer of the appellate court, it
was assumed that the wife was a woman from birth and essential that the operation to which she
had agreed to submit was available. See id. at 58. Judge Wilmer distinguished an earlier case
with similar facts and a different result on the grounds that at the time of the earlier case, "an
operation such as that contemplated by the consultant in the present case was something unknown
to medical science." Id. at 55.
194. Corbett, [1971] P 83 at 107-08. Susan Stryker explains "cisgender" as referring to "the
usually unstated assumption of nontransgender status contained in the words 'man' and 'woman."'
STRYKER, supra note 70, at 22.
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distinguished S. Y.' 95 The wife in Corbett had had sex re-assignment
surgery before the marriage.1 96 But the court concluded, nonetheless, that
she had never been and could never become a woman. 19 7
In short, the Corbett court viewed the intersex wife in S. Y as really
female, but it viewed the transwife in Corbett as really male because born
male.' 98 Interestingly, even the lawyer for the wife in Corbett argued that
the wife "should be classified, medically, as a case of inter-sex, and that,
since the law knew only two sexes, male and female, she must be 'assigned'
to one or the other, which, in her case, could only be female, and that she
should thus be regarded for all purposes as a woman." 99
In another British case, W v. W., 200 decided at the start of the twentyfirst century, a husband sought to show that his marriage was never valid
because his wife was not a woman.20 ' The court agreed that the "biological
test" established in Corbett was not "satisfied" with regard to the wife.202
Yet, the court held for the wife, identifying her as a woman at the time of
the couple's marriage.2 03 The court further reflected that had Judge Ormrod
in Corbett understood that case to involve "physical inter-sex," the court
would have faced a greater challenge and would likely have "given weight
to the genital criteria." 204 The W v. W. court thus concluded that had the
wife in the case
. . . been born today the medical decision taken would have been that she
should be brought up as a girl. If that decision had been made at the time
of the respondent's birth it would have been vindicated by the
respondent's physical development as a result of her partial androgen
insensitivity, her desire from an early age to live as a girl and her final
choice to live as a woman before she started taking oestrogen and had her
surgery. 205

Thus, the court, recognizing the wife as intersex, identified her as a
woman and noted that she would have been identified as female if "born

195. See Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P 83 at 110.
196. See id. at 106.
197. Id. at 107 (describing the wife's vagina, constructed through surgery, as a "cavity").
Judge Omrod further described the story of the couple's relationship and marriage as "essentially
pathetic" and "almost incredible." Id. at 92.
198. See id. at 100-04.
199. Id.
200. See W v. W. [2001] Fam. 111 at 111 (Eng.).
201. Id. at 112.
202. Id. at 139.
203. Id. at 146-47.
204. Id. at 141.
205. Id. at 146.
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today."2 06 This conclusion, apparently necessary to validate the couple's
marriage, reflected a social shift since Corbett.207 At the same time, despite
its comparative flexibility about gender, the court in W v. W assumed, and
thus supported, the binary gender presumption.
In the United States, it seems, only one court validated a marriage
between a transgender spouse and a spouse of the other gender before the
twenty-first century; 208 other courts, often referring to the British cases,
concluded that a transgender spouse belonged to the gender into which that
person had been born. 2 09 In short, before the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded in Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015 that same gender marriage is a
constitutional right,210 states rarely validated a marriage between a
transgender individual and another person of the sex corresponding with the
transgender individual's biological sex at birth. 2 1 1 And when they did, they
depended heavily on the existence of medical evidence that the transgender
party had undergone a biological transition.2 12 That requirement suggested
that transgender people who had transitioned under medical care did not
pose a threat to binary gender assumptions.
In 1999, almost three decades after the British court's decision in
Corbett, a Texas court reached a decision that reflected many of the
assumptions at play in Corbett.213 In the Texas case, Littleton v. Prange,
the court held that the marriage between a transwoman and a cisgender man
was not and never could be valid.2 14 Judge Hardberger, who wrote the
Littleton opinion, seemed unable to credit the possibility that Christie, a
transwoman, was not, in fact, forever a man.
This case involves the most basic of questions. When is a man a man,
and when is a woman a woman? Every schoolchild, even of tender years,
is confident he or she can tell the difference, especially if the person is
wearing no clothes. These are observations that each of us makes early in

206. Id
207. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P 83 at 106 (Eng.).
208. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. App. 1976).
209. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 227-28, 205 (Tex. App. 1999) (noting exception was
opinion of N.J. court in M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. App. 1976); that court concluded
that medical procedures could change an individual's gender but safeguarding a binary view of
gender).
210. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (upholding fundamental right to
marry for same-sex couples).
211. See In re Estate of Araguz, 443 S.W.3d 233, 245 (Tex. App. 2014).
212. See id. at 249-50.
213. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d 223 (involving wrongful death action filed by surviving spouse,
herself a transwoman).
214. See id. at 231.
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life and, in most cases, continue to have more than a passing interest in for
the rest of our lives. It is one of the more pleasant mysteries.
The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician
change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a
person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth? The answer to
that question has definite legal implications that present themselves in this
case involving a person named Christie Lee Littleton. 2 15

The court presumed that the binary gender presumption followed
inexorably from the incontrovertible character of natural and supernatural
laws.216

A year before the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, 217 a court in Texas-the same state that had decided
Littleton fifteen years earlier-identified "a genuine issue of material fact"
about the gender of a woman who had been born male.218 In the fifteen
years between the two cases, a notable social shift had displaced Judge
Hardberger's reliance on nature's eternal truths. In Araguz,2 19 the court
validated a marriage between a man and a. transwoman.220
The court, noting that under Texas law marriages were only valid if
entered into by "one man and one woman," 22 1 concluded, as well, that state
law provided that "an individual who has had a 'sex change' [was] eligible
to marry a person of the opposite sex." 22 2 The court relied heavily on
medical testimony confirming the wife's transition which included "sex
reassignment surgery" to "raise a fact issue regarding [her] sex." 223 Thus,
the court preserved a binary gender presumption but acknowledged that
someone could transition legally from one gender to the other. 224 By this

215. Id. at 223-24.
216. See id. at 224.
217. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
218. In re Estate of Araguz, 443 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. 2014).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 244 (relying primarily on a 2009 legislative change in state law that allowed proof
of identity and age for receipt of marriage license to include "a court order related to an
applicant's 'sex change"').
221. Id. at 245.
222. Id. More particularly, the court concluded that the trial court's summary judgment in
this case cannot be affirmed because "Littleton [9 S.W.3d 223] has been legislatively overruled."
Id.
223. See id. at 248-49.
224. At the time, some commentators even wondered whether validation of marriages
involving a transgender person supported a heteronormative view of marriage that could disrupt
movement toward the recognition of same-gender marriages. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the
Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual
OrientationEquality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 417 (2001) (noting that recognition of validity of

96

SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

time (2014) visions of transgender people had been so broadly transformed
that it might have been more difficult for an intersex partner who identified
as belonging to no gender or more than one gender to have been recognized
as a legal spouse than a transgender person.225
Since the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell,22 6 cases of
the sort discussed in this section have become obsolete. Marriage is a
constitutional right, regardless of the sex or gender of either party.227
However, the cases reviewed in this Part offer a powerful insight into
society and the law's shifting visions of sex, gender, and transgender status.
These cases show, once again, the continuing commitment of society,
medicine, and the law to the binary-gender approach, even as they suggest
the development in recent years of a more flexible vision of gender and
sex. 228
TV. BATHROOMS, LOCKER RooMs,

AND

SPORTS EVENTS

This Part focuses on recent challenges to rules excluding transgender
(and to some extent, intersex) people from bathrooms and locker rooms,
and both groups from sports teams that conform with individuals' gender
identity. During the years of the Obama administration, the law began to
question, and thus to mitigate, such rules of exclusion. Since the start of the
Trump administration, that momentum has slowed and, in some instances,
been stilled.229
Most of the cases addressed in this Part involve transgender people.
Yet, the issues also affect intersex people, though often differently, in large
part because being intersex often can be, and is, kept private. An intersex
high school girl explained that she had been "lucky because my intersex
condition doesn't impact my outward physical traits... . I've never
experienced direct discrimination in bathrooms or in school. I would have
to explain to someone my internal anatomy for someone to understand." 23 0

marriages between transsexual people and people of the opposite gender "run[s] the risk of
reinscribing marriage as a solely heterosexual union.").
225. No cases have been identified in the relevant time period that reflect such facts.
226. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (upholding fundamental right to
marry for same-sex couples).
227. See id.
228. Araguz, 443 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. 2014), and non-marital cases that recognize the
possibility of changing one's gender show the continuing reliance of many courts on medical
evidence in confirming the gender of intersex and transgender people.
229. See infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
230. Mary Emily O'Hara, Intersex Youth Poised to Complicate School Bathroom Battle, NBC
NEWS: NBC OUT, (Mar. 4, 2017, 1:59 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/intersex-
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Yet, intersex people pose a challenge to those who favor segregating
bathrooms, locker rooms and to some extent, sports activities by biological
sex. The intersex advocacy group InterACT has pointed to intersex
children as "proof that physiological sex is not 'binary, objective, and selfevident' any more than is gender identity." 231 The "lived biological reality"
of intersex people challenges traditional views of sex as binary.232 Thus,
quite as much as is the case for transgender people, "the intersex
community is poised to throw a wrench in the argument that facilities
should be segregated according to 'biological' sex rather than gender
identity." 2 33
The first Section of this Part reviews rules in other nations that provide
significant flexibility for transgender people, including students, to use
bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with gender identity. Part B then
considers cases in the U.S. that have challenged rules that preclude
transgender people 23 4 from using bathrooms and locker rooms that reflect
their gender identity. Finally, Section C examines rules regulating the right
to participate on sports teams and in sports events segregated by sex in
conformity with gender identity rather than with apparent sex at birth.
A.

Approaches to Gender and Responses of OtherNations235

Even courts in the U.S. that have supported the right of transgender
people to use bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with gender identity
have tended to assume a binary approach to gender. Sometimes this suits
transgender people, who accept a binary categorization of gender in aiming
to be accepted as one gender or the other. Preservation of a binary gender
perspective has often occurred outside the U.S. as well, even in nations that
have been at the forefront in facilitating social and legal acceptance for
transgender people as members of the gender with which they identify.

youth-poised-complicate-school-bathroom-battle-n728886.
The child quoted, referred to as
"Ellie," has Swyer Syndrome, resulting in XY chromosomes, and "unformed sex glands." Id.
2 3 1. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. There seem to be no reported cases involving the right of intersex people to use
bathrooms of one gender or the other (or all bathrooms, regardless of gender markings). This does
not refer to people who are intersex and transgender. In that situation, a person may face the same
constraints on the use of public bathroom as are faced by other transgender people. The situation
of bathroom use by intersex people is noted in at least one case involving transgender litigants.
G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 720-21 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, Gloucester Cty.
Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239(2017) (mem.).
235. See also supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
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Many nations that have begun to meet the needs of transgender people
still cling to a binary vision of gender, but at least eight nations have
accepted a non-binary notion of gender and now provide for an
"unspecified" gender identity on passports.236 In Malta, Ireland, Argentina,
New Zealand, Denmark, and Colombia, people can obtain new gender
designations on official documents without submitting supporting medical
documentation.23 7 in most of these nations, society and the law have also
begun to offer bathroom and locker room access to transgender people on
the basis of gender identity.23 8 School children in Malta, Norway,
Argentina, and Ireland can use bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with
their gender identities.23 9 And in Norway, the nation's "sports federation"
directs schools to allow transgender girls to play on girls' sports teams. The
explanation focuses on "inclusiveness," which the League has explained,
outweighs "any concerns about competitive advantage."2 40 One ten-year
old Norwegian transgender girl reported feeling "liberated" by that nation's
law. Now registered as a girl, the child, born male, has access to female
bathrooms and locker rooms.24 1
Still, however, most responses to such issues, even in nations with
more flexible responses than those in the U.S., assume the perseverance of a
binary approach to gender. Transitioning between genders is
accommodated, but, still, it is usually assumed that one must be male or
female. Cases considered in the next Section of this Article similarly
demonstrate some flexibility regarding traditional views of sex and gender.
Yet, still, these cases give little heed to the concerns of those who would

236. Anna James (AJ) Neuman Wipfler, Identity Crisis: The Limitations of Expanding
Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless Identity Document,
39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 491, 512 (2016). These nations include Malta, Nepal, New Zealand,
Denmark, Germany, Australia, Bangladesh, and India. Id. at 517.
237. Id. at 509-11 n.115 (citing GIGESC § 3(l)(c)); see also Shawn Pogatchnik,
Transgender-rightsBattle in U.S. Leaves Europeans Baffled: Trump's Toilet Policy Causes
Bewilderment, TIMES COLONIST (Victoria, B.C.), Feb. 25, 2017, at Cl. See also supra notes 8590 and accompanying text (explaining Malta's law on right to "be treated according to ... gender
identity and ... to be identified in that way in the documents providing . . . identity therein").
238. See Pogatchnik,supra note 237, at Cl.
Pogatchnik reported that transgender children in Norway, permitted to use
239. Id.
bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with their gender identity may be asked to arrive at the
school locker room a few minutes before the other children when changing in the locker room. Id.
See also Shawn Pogatchnik, Other Nations Shaking Heads at US TransgenderToilet Battle, THE
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Feb. 24, 2017, 9:01 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/
article.php?id=4979326&itype-CMSID.
240. Pogatchnik, supra note 237, at Cl.
241. Id. The only difference between this girl and other girls is that she arrives 5 minutes
before other girls when she changes in the locker room at her school. Id.
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choose to be identified as both genders or who do not identity with the male
or female gender.
B. The Right to Choose One's Bathroom or Locker Room in Conformity
with One's Gender Identity
In 2010, a law review article referred to "bathroom" cases as "one type
of case that [transgender individuals] still consistently lose."24 2 That has
changed. However, the issue continues to be hotly disputed in courts and
within society. And, while transgender litigants have won some bathroomaccess cases in the United States in the last few years, that trend may be
reversing, at least in part due to the 2016 change in the federal
administration.24 3
Access to school and public bathrooms can significantly impact one's
everyday life - and one's emotional responses. Without access to
bathrooms, it is difficult to travel, to remain at work or school throughout a
day, and to avoid a sense of humiliation. Transgender people are not the
first group in the United States to initiate legal cases seeking the right to use
bathrooms to which they have been denied access in schools, places of
employment, restaurants, and other public domains. 2 " Ruth Colker recalls
"[w]hites only signs" and suggests that they remind society of how recently
and how "commonplace" it was that racial segregation in the South in the
U.S. included separate bathrooms for whites and blacks.245
Many of the cases about the right of transgender people to access
bathrooms conforming with their gender identities have challenged courts
to interpret federal civil rights laws that protect people against "sex"
discrimination - especially Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title IX of the Educations Amendments of 1972246- to also protect people
242. Ilana Gelfnan, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of
Discrimination "Because of... [Perceived] Sex", 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55, 115
(2010) (referring, in particular, to cases brought pursuant to Title VII).
243. See infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text; see also Texas v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016). In 2017, Shannon Minter reported an "unprecedented
backlash" against transgender people. Two states, Mississippi and North Carolina passed laws
denying protections to transgender people. Both laws have been challenged in court. Shannon
Minter, Feature, TransgenderRights: A Time of Transition, 34 GPSOLo 26, 26 (2017).
244. Ruth Colker, Public restrooms: Flippingthe Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 146-47
(2017).
245. Id.
246. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against
job applicants and employees with regard, among other matters, to hiring, firing, pay, and the
terms of employment on the basis of an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S § 2000e-2(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No.
115-73). Second, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, states that "[n]o person ...
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against discrimination on the basis of gender identity. Although some
courts have responded affirmatively to that challenge and have interpreted
"sex" to encompass gender identity, they have often also re-enforced binary
understandings of gender.2 4 7 Moreover, the anti-discrimination laws on
which litigants have relied have generally depended upon and supported the
presumption that people are either male or female.
1.

Public Bathrooms

Cases involving transgender people seeking to use bathrooms
conforming with their gender identity rather than their sex at birth are more
likely to reinforce a binary categorization of people (here, regarding gender)
than were bathroom-access cases involving blacks precluded from access to
"whites only" bathrooms (then, regarding race). Indeed, some transgender
people have favored the binary-gender presumption and have stressed the
importance of having separate bathrooms for men and women.
Laverne Cox, a transwoman, was asked during an ABC interview why
she continues to struggle with the public restroom issue.248 Cox answered:
Well I, as a transgender American, I often find myself, especially in public
spaces, I remember recently, I was doing a TV show, and I was on
television to talk about the bathroom issue. And I was at MSNBC, and I
was like, everybody's watching me. I was, like, where's the, may I use
the ladies' room? And I was, like everybody is going to look and see
which bathroom I'm going in. So, it's just something. It's an extra thing I
find myself thinking about because I'm trans. 249
Dean Spade, a transgender man, attorney, and law professor, has
described the indignity of being told one cannot use a bathroom consistent
with one's gender identity. Spade wrote about his own arrest in 2002 for
using a men's room in Grand Central Station. Spade was kept in jail for 23
hours "on a false trespassing charge." 250 In response to the arrest, Spade
explained:
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681(a) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 115-73).
247. Most of the recent cases within the set examined in this Part involve claims by
transgender, not intersex, people.
248. Interview by Sara Haines with Laverne Cox, Actor, Orange is the New Black, The View
(ABC television broadcast June 16, 2017) (transcript available on LEXIS).
249. Id.
250. Dean Spade, Commentary: Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 17 n.5 (2003). Through this humiliating experience, Spade gained a sense "of

what more vulnerable trans people (homeless, youth, people of color, disabled) face daily." Id.
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[p]eople all over the internet seem to be wondering: Is my claim to use the
men's room legitimate? Have I failed to meet the conditions of manliness
(or transmanliness) such that the arrest was deserved? What do I look
like?
Trans people and non-trans people alike have been making
arguments on list serve, comment boards, and in emails to me with
varying levels of blame about my arrest. To some, whether or not I am to
blame depends on whether or not what I did was illegal (which it was not).
To others, whether or not I am to blame depends on how much I look like
a man. And a third set seem to be saying that the fact that this experience
happened to me means that it was deserved, because I failed to pass as a
man and that is my shortcoming. 251

The third explanation for "blame" offered by Spade assumes a binary
gender perspective as the assessor of appropriate (transgender) conduct.
2.

School Bathrooms and Locker Rooms

More than a decade after Spade wrote about his having been arrested
for using a public men's room, Gavin Grimm, a transgender boy (known as
G.G. in court papers), sued his community's school board, seeking the right
to use the boys' bathroom at his school.252 Gavin's case as well as Gavin,
himself, attracted significant media attention.2 53
Gavin, whose sex at birth was female, began to transition in 2014,
before his sophomore year of high school. 254 After talking with school
officials about his transition, Gavin initially agreed to use a bathroom in the
office of the school nurse and to satisfy the school's physical education
requirement through a home school program.255 For a short time in 2014,
Gavin was permitted to use the boy's bathroom at school.256 Gavin has
explained that his peers did not object to that: "All I want," he asserted, "is
to ... use the restroom in peace, and I have had no problems from students
to do that - only from adults."2 57 Responding to pressure from community
251. Dean Spade, 2 Legit 2 Quit, "What was He Wearing?", PISS & VINEGAR,
http://www.makezine.org/21egit.html (last visited July 11, 2017).
252. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va.
2015), rev'd, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct.
1239 (2017) (mem.).
253. A Lexis search (July 2017) for "Gavin Grimm" AND transgender AND bathroom
yielded over 2,200 results in the Lexis News file.
254. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 739.
255. Id. at 740.
256. Id.
257. Rebecca Klein, Gavin Grimm Could Be a National Hero for Trans Students, But He'd
Rather Be a
"Normal Child", HUFF.
POST
(Oct.
14, 2016,
2:06
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gavin-grimm-supreme-courttransgender-us_58002c89e4b0e8cl98a74692.
The district court noted that a declaration
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members, the school board intervened, precluding Gavin's continued use of
the boy's room. In December 2014, the board voted 6-1 in favor of a
resolution that provided, in part:
It shall be the practice of the [Gloucester County Public Schools] to
provide male and female restroom and locker room facilities in its schools,
and the use of said facilities shall be limited to the corresponding
biological genders, and students with gender identity issues shall be
provided an alternative appropriate private facility. 258
After passage of that resolution, the school installed three single-stall
restrooms that could be used by anyone.259 Gavin contended that use of
these restrooms would "stigmatize and isolate" him. 260 Gavin then sued the
school board, arguing that the board's refusing to allow him to use the
boys' restrooms violated Title IX 261 and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 62
In 2015, a year after Gavin brought his case, the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) issued an opinion letter that explained: "When a school elects to
separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex. . . a school
generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender
identity." 263 That interpretation concerned an agency regulation that
allowed limiting access to bathrooms "on the basis of sex." 264 Yet, a federal
district court in Virginia concluded that it did not owe "Chevron-style
deference" to the agency's "interpretation" 26 5 and that the regulation at
issue was not "ambiguous." The district court opined that since the
regulation permitted the school board "to limit bathroom access 'on the

submitted to the court from Troy Andersen, a School Board member, reported the Board to have
"receiv[ed] numerous complaints from parents and students" after G.G. began to use the boys'
bathroom. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
258. Id. at 740.
259. Id. at 741.
260. Id.
261. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681(a) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 115-73).
262. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 738.
263. Letter to Emily Prince from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec'y for
Pol'y,
U.S.
Dep't
of Educ.,
Office for Civil
Rights
(Jan.
7, 2015),
http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender-student-restroom access_1 -2015.pdf. See
also U.S. Dep't of Just. & U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students,

(May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-titleix-transgender.pdf (also noting: "As is consistently recognized in civil rights cases, the desire to
accommodate others' discomfort cannot justify a policy that singles out and disadvantages a
particular class of students.").
264. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 744-46 (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2017)).
265. Id. at 746 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
ED.GOV,
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basis of sex,' including birth or biological sex,"266 the board was not
violating the regulation by refusing to recognize Gavin's "sex" as male.
Accordingly, the court dismissed Grimm's Title IX claim and thus denied
his request for a preliminary injunction.267 The court concluded, in short,
that requiring Gavin Grimm to use the female bathroom or one of the three
single-stall bathrooms "did not impermissibly discriminate against him on
the basis of sex" because he was biologically female.268
Grimm appealed to the Fourth Circuit. That court gave more weight to
the interpretation offered by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR),269 finding
the language of the regulation "ambiguous" with regard to "how a school
should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female for
the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms."2 70 The court wrote:
We conclude that the regulation is susceptible to more than one plausible
reading because it permits both the Board's reading - determining
maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to genitalia - and the
Department's interpretation - determining maleness or femaleness with
reference to gender identity. 27 1
The Fourth Circuit's framing of Gavin's case made his victory there
vulnerable to future shifts in interpretation. More specifically, the court's
focus on OCR's letter interpreting the agency regulation opened the way for
alternative conclusions should the agency rescind or replace its
interpretative letter with a different letter, taking a position less favorable to
transgender students such as Gavin. That happened in the early months of
the Trump administration, soon after the Fourth Circuit decision was
handed down.272 In light of the Fourth Circuit's dependence on the
agency's interpretation of the regulation and the shift in agency policy
during the early months of the Trump administration, in March 2017, the
U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit judgment and remanded the
case. 2 73

266. Id. at 746.
267. Id. at 753.
268. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining
conclusion of district court).
269. Id.at718-21.
270. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33; see also G. G., 822 F.3d at 715.
271. G.G., 822 F.3d at 720.
272. Gloucester Cty Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (U.S. 2017) (vacating judgment and
remandirng case to the Fourth Circuit "in light of the guidance document issued by the Department
of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017").
273. Id.; see also, Transgender Teen Hailed by DOJ Group, WASH. POST, June 29, 2017, at
B03.
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Alternatives were available to the court. An independent interpretation
of Title IX that relied on judicial interpretations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964274 could have supported Gavin's claim, thereby allowing
the Fourth Circuit to reach the same conclusion that it did reach, though on
different and less fragile grounds.2 75 The Fourth Circuit could have
protected Gavin's right to use the boy's bathroom through reference to
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.2 7 6 While the implications of Title VII for
transgender people remain uncertain, the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in
Price Waterhouse2 77 can be read to extend Title VII protection to
transgender populations. In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that
"[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of gender." 2 78 Moreover, by 2017, six federal circuit
courts had extended protection to transgender people pursuant to Title
vII.

2 79

-

In response to the Supreme Court's order to vacate and remand in
Gavin Grimm's case, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction
that gave Grimm the right to use the boy's bathroom in his high school.280
Judge Andre Davis, who concurred in the unopposed motion to vacate the
preliminary injunction,281 counted Gavin Grimm among "the list of
plaintiffs whose struggle for justice has been delayed and rebuffed"
people such as "Dred Scott, Fred Korematsu, Linda Brown, Mildred and
Richard Loving, Edie Windsor, and Jim Obergefell."282 Judge Davis
continued:
[A]s Dr. King reminded us, however, "the arc of the moral universe is
long, but it bends toward justice." G.G.'s journey is delayed but not
finished. G.G.'s case is about much more than bathroom. It's about a boy
asking his school to treat him just like any other boy. It's about protecting
274. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (LEXIS through Pub. L.
No. 115-73).
275. See, e.g., Sam Williamson, Note and Comment, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County
School Board: BroadeningTitle IX's Protectionsfor TransgenderStudents, 76 MD. L. REV. 1102,
1112-13 (2017).
276. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
277. Id.
278. Id. at250.
279. Minter, supra note 243, at 27 (noting that First, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Title VII to protect transgender people).

280. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93164, at *3 (E.D. Va. June
23, 2016).
281. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729, 730 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, J.,
concurring) (concurring in unopposed motion to vacate preliminary injunction).
282. Id.
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the rights of transgender people in public spaces and not forcing them to
exist on the margins. It's about governmental validation of the existence
and experiences of transgender people, as well as the simple recognition of
their humanity. His case is part of a larger movement that is redefining
and broadening the scope of civil and human rights so that they extend to a
vulnerable group that has traditionally been unrecognized, unrepresented,
and unprotected.283
At that time (early 2017), Gavin Grimm was a high school senior. That
spring he graduated. Yet, his attorneys filed a new brief with the Fourth
Circuit, claiming that Grimm, as an alumnus visiting the school, would be
subject to the school's bathroom rules.284
Although G.G. involved a transgender boy, the 2016 Fourth Circuit
opinion in the case offers one of the very few court decisions (among those
considering the applicability of Title IX to transgender students seeking the
right to use bathrooms conforming with their gender identity) that mentions
intersex people.285 Judge Floyd, writing for the Fourth Circuit, concluded
that the federal regulation at issue in the case contained ambiguities, and
then asked about the application of the federal rule to several groups,
distinct, at least in some regard, from the transgender community:
It is not clear to us how the regulation would apply in a number of
situations - even under the Board's own "biological gender" formulation.
For example, which restroom would a transgender individual who had
undergone sex-reassignment surgery use? What about an intersex
individual? What about an individual bom with X-X-Y sex chromosomes?
28 6
What about an individual who lost external genitalia in an accident?
In the same year that the Fourth Circuit held for Gavin Grimm, a
federal district court in Ohio held for an eleven-year old transgender girl
who wanted to use the girls' bathroom in her Palatine, Ohio elementary
school.287 The girl ("Jane Doe" (hereinafter "Jane")) had transitioned
socially, but not physically.28 8 The girl's school-Highland Elementary
283.

Id.

284.

Associated Press, Transgender Teen Argues Case Still Relevant After Graduation, U.S.

NEWS (May 8, 2017, 5:51 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/virginia/articles/201705-08/transgender-teen-argues-case-still-relevant-after-graduation.
285. Even in other contexts, there are few to no Title VII or Title IX cases involving intersex
people. Writing in 2010, Ilana Gelfman noted the existence of only one sex discrimination case in
the employment context with an intersex plaintiff. Gelfinan, supra note 242, at 72-73. And that
case, Wood v. C.G. Studios Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987), was decided pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Gelfnan, supra note 242, at 72-73.
286. G.G., 822 F.3d at 720-21.
287. Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850,
878-79 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
288. Id. at 855.
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School in Ohio-agreed to refer to Jane by her female name but refused to
change official records to reflect that name. Further, school policy provided
for bathroom use corresponding to a child's "biological sex." 289
Jane used the office bathroom during first grade. Her parents told the
school's principal that this practice had negative mental health
consequences for Jane. 290 During second grade, she was required to use a
unisex bathroom in the teachers' lounge. According to Jane, teachers
looked at her unkindly ("glare[d] at her") when she passed through the
lounge to use the restroom. 291 Further, Jane said that members of the
school's staff referred to her with male pronouns, and that the school failed
to respond to students who harassed her.292 Thus, the issues facing Jane
included but went beyond her access to bathrooms corresponding to her
gender identity. By the end of the school year, Jane suffered from "suicidal
ideation and depressed mood," resulting in her hospitalization.29 3 Before
starting fourth grade, Jane tried to commit suicide.2 94
During the next few years, school policy remained firm,295 and parents
of other students asserted that their children were discomforted by Jane's
bathroom use - explaining, in effect, that they were discomforted by any
transgender student's presence in the school. One parent of a boy at the
school explained that she "did not approve of her son sharing a restroom,
locker room, or overnight accommodations with girls." 29 6 Another parent at
the school reported that her foster daughters had suffered sexual abuse, that
for them "the male anatomy is a weapon by which they were assaulted,"
and that they would "feel vulnerable being in the presence of biological
males when showering, changing clothes, or using the bathroom." 2 97
In the spring of 2016, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the U.S.
Department of Education informed the school that it was violating Title IX
by not allowing Jane to use facilities consistent with her female identity.2 98

289. Id. at 856.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See generally id.
296. Id. at 858 (quoting and citing Declaration of Parent H., Bd. of Educ. of the Highland
Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524 (S.D. Ohio 2016) Doc. No. 68 ¶¶ 2, 5).
297. Id. (quoting and citing Declaration of S.B., Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist.
v. U.S. Dep't Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524 (S.D. Ohio 2016) Doc. No. 69 IM 6, 14-15).
298. Id. Under Title IX, no person "shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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The school rejected OCR's Resolution Agreement and brought suit. 29 9 In
June 2017, the Education Department's Office of Civil Rights under the
Trump administration withdrew from the case. 3" The acting head of the
office explained that the administration had rescinded the guidance that
directed schools to give transgender students access to bathrooms
conforming with their gender identities.3 01 Further, she noted, Jane had
filed a legal challenge to Highland's rules. The courts, she explained,
would resolve the girl's claim, apparently without help from OCR.302
Further, litigation challenging the Department of Education's position
on bathroom and locker room use for transgender students under the Obama
administration was filed by Texas, joined by eleven other states,303 in July
A Texas district court granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
2016.3
injunction that prohibited enforcement of the agency's guidance on
transgender students' bathroom use.30 s The United States appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.30 6 However, early in the Trump administration, a "Dear
Colleague" letter from the Departments of Justice and Education withdrew
the departments' letters authored during the previous administration (of
January 2016 and May 2016) that requested schools to provide transgender
students with access to bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with their
gender identity.307 In March 2017, the federal government moved to
dismiss the appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

299. See 208 F. Supp. 3d at 859. The court allowed Jane and her parents to intervene in the
case. Id. It concluded that Jane was likely to succeed on her Title IX and equal protection claims.
The court further opined that the equal protection claim required "heightened scrutiny," id. at 872,
but that Jane would likely succeed were the court to "apply a rational basis review." Id. at 877. In
significant part, this conclusion followed from Highland's failure to show that Jane's use of girls'
bathrooms posed a privacy or security concern for other students. See id.
300. Emma Brown, Education Department Closes Transgender Student Cases; Feds Push to
Scale Back Civil Rights Investigations,DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2017, at B9 (LEXIS).
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. In addition to Texas, these states included Alabama, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Arizona,
Maine, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia, West Virginia, Mississippi, and Kentucky. Texas v.
United States, 679 Fed. App'x 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2017).
304. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
305. Id. at 836.
306. Texas, 679 Fed. App'x at 322.
307. U.S. Dep't of Just. & U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter, JUSTICE.GOV, (Feb.
22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941551/download. The letter opined that
the Obama administration "guidance documents on transgender students' right to access bathroom
and locker rooms consistent with gender identity were not subject to "extensive legal analysis."
Further the Feb. 22, 2017 letter read:
[The Obama administration] interpretation has given rise to significant litigation regarding
school restrooms and locker rooms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "sex" in the regulations is ambiguous and deferred to what the court
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Sports Teams and Sports Events

The world of sports long functioned through the lens of a binaryOpposition to facilitating the participation of
gender perspective.
transgender and intersex athletes in conformity with their gender identities
has been strong. Yet, concerns among those opposing such participation
often differ from the concerns of those opposing use of bathrooms and even
locker rooms consistent with gender identity. In the domain of sports, a
central challenge to the participation of transwomen athletes and of some
female intersex athletes has focused on questions about competitive
Dorianne Coleman, a law professor and former runner
unfairness.
commented critically on the possible inclusion in women's sports of
intersex athletes: "'Ifyou start to do this, you are making a joke of the fact
that there are two classifications - male and female."'30 8 Furthermore, she
suggested, it would make as much sense to "'open it up and have women
competing with men."'309 This Section first considers responses to intersex
and transgender athletes in international sports; it then considers responses
regarding participation in school teams and at school sporting events in the
United States.
1.

Competitive International Sports

Challenges to participation in sports have faced transwomen and
intersex women, rather than transmen and intersex men. Renee Richards
(born Richard Raskin) was an ophthalmologist, a parent, and a tennis player
when he had gender reassignment surgery.3 10 After the surgery, she was
prohibited from playing in the U.S. Open. Richards sued and won.
Richards attributed her legal victory to an affidavit from champion tennis
player, Billie Jean King, who affirmed that she knew Richards, that
Richards was female, and that she should be allowed to compete as a female

characterized as the "novel" interpretation advanced in the guidance. By contrast, a federal
district court in Texas held that the term "sex" unambiguously refers to biological sex and
that, in any event, the guidance was "legislative and substantive" and thus formal rulemaking
should have occurred prior to the adoption of any such policy. In August 2016, the Texas
court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the interpretation, and that nationwide injunction
has not been overturned. In addition, the Departments believe that, in this context, there
must be due regard for the primary role of the States and local school districts in establishing
educational policy.

Id.
308. Gina Kolata, lO.C. Panel Calls for Treatment in Sex Ambiguity Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/sports/olympics/21ioc.html?emc=etal.
309. Id.
310. Sara Lentati, Tennis's Reluctant Transgender Pioneer, BBC (June 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33062241.
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tennis player.3 1' Richards, who retired from tennis in 1981, did well,
though not superbly, as a female competitor.3 12 As Richards's story might
suggest, virtually all of the shifts favoring transgender participation on
teams and in sports events corresponding with gender identity have
safeguarded a binary-gender perspective. Precluding athletes deemed
male... from participating in women's sports 3 14 re-enforces a binary-gender
approach by concentrating on presumed differences between men and
women in athletic events.
It has also held serious, often painful,
consequences for both intersex and transgender athletes.
For thirty years, beginning in 1968, international sports competition,
including the Olympics, relied on a test - the Barr Body test - which

checked for the number of X chromosomes in an individual's genome.315
This test, in theory at least, identified male athletes under the presumption
that males had an XY genotype.3 16 Yet, even though an XY male could, in
theory, be identified through use of the test, the test would fail to identify
some females as female (e.g., those with only one X) and would identify
some males as female (e.g., those with an XXY genotype).31 7 Furthermore,
the Barr Body test does not assess steroid or testosterone levels. 3 18
In the early 2000s, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
resolved uncertainty about the eligibility of transgender athletes to compete
in sports in conformity with the gender with which they identified.
Following the recommendations of the IOC Medical Commission which
met in Stockholm, the IOC provided that anyone who went through gender

311.

Id.

312.

Id.

313. See generally infra note 316 and accompanying text.
314. The assumption behind this effort has been that males are more competitive as athletes
than women. That is a statistical conclusion, and is not accurate for all sports. See generally Lexa
W. Lee, How Do Men and Women Differ Athletically?, LIVESTRONG.COM, (Sept. 11, 2017),
Lee notes
http://www.livestrong.com/article/347443-athletic-differences-between-men-women/.
that in sports such as shooting and equestrian activities, women are competitive with men. These
sports require "balance and mental concentration." Id.
315. The number of Barr bodies is one less than the number of X chromosomes. Thus, in
theory an XX woman has one Barr Body, and an XY male has none. However, a female with
only one X will also have no Barr bodies and an XXY male will have one. See Robert Ritchie et
al., Intersex and the Olympic Games, 101 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 395, 397 (2008).
316. Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critiqueof Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 WiS.
J.L. GENDER& Soc'Y 29, 33 (2015).
317. See Ritchie et al., supra note 315.
318. Buzuvis, supra note 316, at 33 (noting that an intersex person with Androgen
Insensitivity Syndrome has an XY genotype). Although people with Androgen Insensitivity
Syndrome produce male hormones, they cannot use them. Further, the Barr Body test would
identify women with Turner's syndrome (and an X genotype) as not female but not identify as
male an XXY male with Klinefelter's syndrome. Id. at 34.
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reassignment during childhood would be identified for purposes of
competing as a member of the gender to which the person had
transitioned." Those who transitioned after childhood could compete in
conformity with their gender identity if they had undergone "surgical
including external genitalia changes and
anatomical changes . .
gonadectomy and met several other tests."320 Three years earlier, the IOC
had adopted a rule that depended on hormone levels. IOC's report declares
that "[n]othing in these Regulations is intended to make any determination
of sex. Instead, these Regulations are designed to identify circumstances in
which a particular athlete will not be eligible (by reason of hormonal
characteristics) to participate in 2012 OG Competitions in the female
category."3 21 A rule that measures hormone levels excludes many intersex
women and transwomen from sports competition as women.3 2 2 And, again,
despite the disclaimer in the rule, it supports the binary-gender
presumption. In 2014, the Court of Arbitration for Sport suspended the
rule, offering a partial victory to Dutee Chand, a female intersex runner,3 23
who brought a case after having been excluded from competition by the
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAFF)3 24 because her

319.

INT'L OLYMPIC COMM. MED. COMM'N, STATEMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONSENSUS

ON SEX REASSIGNMENT IN SPORTS (2003), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/
enreport905.pdf.
320. These athletes were required to obtain legal recognition from "appropriate official
authorities" concerning their gender identity and to have received hormonal therapy so as "to
minimize gender-related advantages in sport competitions." Id. This protocol limits participation
in international competitions for transgender people who lack the resources to have sex
reassignment surgery or who live in places that make it difficult to obtain legal recognition of a
gender change. LINDSAY PARKS PIEPER, SEX TESTING: GENDER POLICING IN WOMEN'S SPORTS

223 n.77 (2016). Although the Stockholm consensus appears to be gender neutral, it makes far
less sense for a transman competing in international sports competitions than for a transwoman.
Buzuvis, supra note 316, at 33. In 2015, IOC guidelines acknowledged transmen and provided
that they were free to compete as men. Id. at 39.
321.

INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC REGULATIONS ON FEMALE HYPERANDROGENISM (2012),

https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/CommissionsPDFfiles/Medical-comnmission/2012-0622-IOC-Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf.
322. See Buzuvis, supra note 316, at 36. Female athletes may compete, despite hormones
above the limits set, by showing that they have androgen insensitivity syndrome or for some other
reason, are hyperandrogenic. Id. at 37-38.
323. Chand seems to have been diagnosed with hyperandrogenism which causes her to have
more androgen than most females. See Ronald S. Katz & Robert W. Luckinbill, Changing
Sex/Gender Roles and Sport, 28 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 215, 237-38 (2017).
324. The IAAF is an international sports governing body, www.iaaf.org.

2017]

DISCRIMINATING GENDER

111

testosterone levels were reportedly too high for her to compete as a
female.32 5
In 2015, the IOC updated its policy about transwomen's participation
in women's athletic events so as to allow a transwoman to compete in
competitive sports as a woman by showing that she has identified as a
female for at least four years and that her testosterone had not exceeded a
set level for one year.3 26 Reliance on such tests insists - though not
expressly - on safeguarding a binary view of gender. It is also troublesome
because the interpretation of such tests (even if one assumes that gender is
binary) can result in inaccurate or uncertain assessments.327
2.

School Sports

Within the U.S., there has been significant debate and disagreement
about facilitating the participation of transgender girls in school athletic
activities. Some states have enabled students to participate in competitive
sports on the basis of their gender identities.3 28 Others have not.3 29 During
the Obama administration, the Departments of Education and Justice
directed schools receiving federal funds to allow students to take part in
school sports in accordance with their gender identities. That participation
was not made contingent on a medical diagnosis.330 In February 2017, the
guidance was revoked by the Department of Education and the Department
325. Chand had been precluded from participating in competition because her testosterone
level was above the set level. Chand v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2014/A/3759, Ruling
of Hon. J. Bennett 2 (July 24, 2015); Buzuvis, supra note 316, at 39.
326. Buzuvis, supra note 316, at 38.
327. Katz & Luckinbill, supra note 323, at 232-34.
328. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5 (West 2002 & Supp. 2017). California's Education
Code provides:
(e) Participation in a particular physical education activity or sport, if required of pupils of
one sex, shall be available to pupils of each sex.
(f) A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities,
including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her gender
identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil's records.

Id. The Washington Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA) allows for participation by
students in athletics in conformity with gender identity. 2015-2016 WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC
ACTIVITIES ASS'N, HANDBOOK 31 (ed. 2015), http://www.wiaa.com/ConDocs/

Conl544/Handbook%20201516.pdf. The handbook explains: "All students should have the
opportunity to participate in WIAA activities in a manner that is consistent with their gender
identity, irrespective of the gender listed on a student's records." Id. at 32.
329. See Morgan Shell, Comment, Transgender Student-Athletes in Texas School Districts:
Why Can't the UIL Give All Students Equal Playing Time?, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1043, 1045
(2016).
330. U.S. Dep't of Just. & U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender
Students, ED.GOV, (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf.
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Students may still receive

protection under state law, but not all states offer such protection.33 2
Among the states, California is the most inclusive of transgender
students' wishing to participate in sports activities in conformity with their
gender identity. That state's statutory law permits students to participate in
sports on the basis of assumed gender333 and does not predicate that
participation on the student's having had surgery or hormone therapy. 33 4 in
other states, transgender students may gain the right to participate in sports
in conformity with their gender identity only if they have had sexreassignment or other medical interventions. 335 In Idaho, for instance, a
transgender girl can take part in girls' sports at school only after showing
that she has had at least a year of hormone treatment.33 6 In 2016, school
superintendents and directors of school athletics in Texas voted to require
student athletes to participate in sports in conformity with the gender on
their birth certificates.33 7
Yet, student and professional athletes whose gender identity is
ambiguous or does not conform with biological sex at birth have recently
enjoyed increasing opportunities to compete on teams reflecting their
gender identity.3 38 Whether that trend will continue, at least in the U.S.
under the present federal administration, is not certain. In any event,
increased flexibility in understandings of gender during the first decade and
a half of this century served transgender athletes who continued, after
transition, to identify as male or female. The new flexibility served athletes
who chose be to identified as members of more than one gender or of no

331. Plus Media Solutions, Oregon: Transgender Student Ruling Doesn't Affect Oregon
Schools, U.S. OFFICIAL NEWS, Feb. 28, 2017 (LEXIS).
332. Id. (noting that Oregon Law, ORS 659.850 and ORS 174.100, prohibits state schools
from discriminating against students on the basis of gender identity and reporting that students
receive similar protection in fifteen states).
333. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5 (West 2002 & Supp. 2017).
334. Shell, supra note 329, at 1064; Ellen Huet, New State Law Opens Doorsfor Transgender
Students, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/New-state-lawopens-doors-for-transgender-students-4726696.php.
335. See Shell, supranote 329, at 1066.
336. Id.
337. Schuyler Dixon, Texas Officials Grapple with Issues in Transgender Case: Injunction
Denied, NATIONAL POST, Feb. 24, 2017, at B7 (LEXIS). In 2017, the state legislature considered
a bill (passed in the Senate but left in committee in the state House) that ostensibly focuses on
steroid use but that, in fact, discriminates against transgender students wanting to join sports
teams. Madison Park, Protest and Turmoil Rock Last Day of Texas Legislative Session,
CNN.COM, May 30, 2017 (LEXIS). See generally Shell, supra note 329, at 1064.
338. See generally Shell, supra note 329, at 1064.
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gender less often. 3 39 Again, this difference reflects the strength of the
binary-gender presumption.
CONCLUSION

Society has long assumed - and more recently, law and medicine have
helped safeguard - a binary-gender perspective.
This perspective,
understood as reflecting biological "truth," has not accounted for or
accommodated intersex and transgender populations. Both groups have
faced significant discrimination, including even efforts to mask and deny
their existence. Yet, views of intersex people and discrimination against
them have differed from views of transgender people and discrimination
against them. In large part, those differences can be explained by
distinctions in the challenges each group presents to the binary-gender
perspective.
The consequences of discrimination for intersex and transgender
people are often overwhelming. They have included lack of access to
needed medical care; provision of unwanted medical care; legal
prohibitions on marrying the person of one's choice;340 inability to obtain
identity documents in conformity with gender identity; and exclusion from
bathrooms, locker rooms and sports teams conforming with gender identity,
as well as ostracism, humiliation, and prejudice at school and at work.3 41
The Article has framed the role that medicine and law have played, often in
concert, in preserving - sometimes even while attempting to amelioratesuch discriminatory treatment. In significant part, that can be attributed to
the strength of the binary-gender presumption.
During the present century, society, law and medicine have seemed
increasingly ready to accept gender fluidity, but only to a limited extent.
For people whose gender fluidity involves a transition from one gender to
another, the law in the U.S., reflecting the perspective of a good part, but
not all, of the society, has offered some recognition and assistance to

339. See generally Katz, & Luckinbill, supra note 323, at 243.
340. Although some courts had begun to validate marriages between transgender people and
members of the other gender before 2015, see supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text, the
Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015), found a
constitutional right for people of the same gender to marry. As a result, the presumed gender or
sex at birth of a transgender marriage partner (or partners) no longer bars their entering into valid
marriages.
341. People whose genders do not conform with a binary-approach to gender have faced
significant discrimination in employment contexts as well. That is, however, beyond the scope of

this Article.
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transgender people.342 Whether that trend will continue in the years ahead,
however, is uncertain. During the first months of the Trump administration,
the Departments of Education and Justice rescinded interpretive guidelines
issued during the Obama administration that had included gender identity as
an aspect of the definition of the term "sex," as used in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.343
And in July 2017, President Trump announced on Twitter that the military
would no longer allow transgender people to serve in the nation's armed
forces. 344
The U.S. has reached a pivotal moment, one testing its willingness to
sustain and expand upon protections afforded to intersex and transgender
people. The issues carry significant implications for those most directly
affected, for those who are part of or who support the larger LGBT
community, and for society more broadly.

342. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text; see also supra subsections IV.B.1 & 2.
343. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
344. Davis & Cooper, supra note 1. President Trump's announcement, originally delivered
through Twitter, was formalized in August with a Memorandum. Stone v. Trump, No. MJG-172459, 2017 WL 5589122, at *4 (D.C. Md. Nov. 21, 2017) (citing President's Mem. § 1(a), Pls.'
Mot. Ex. 18, ECF No. 40-21). Since that time, several suits have contested the new policy. See,
e.g., Stone, 2017 WL 5589122, at *18 (halting ban on transgender people in military); Doe 1 v.
Trump, No. 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *33 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017) (halting ban on
transgender people in military); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Karnoski v.
Trump, No. 2:17-cv-01297-MJP, (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Stockman v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-06516, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017).

